

JOHN HOWELL -- JULY 21, 1982

JH: On February 10, we went to Farhad Baktiar's office at Bank Omran, fairly early in the morning, 8:30 a.m. is what I've got. Met with him, he had explained to us earlier that it needs central bank approval and the reason for our early morning visit was to get that process going and make sure it happened. Somewhat surprisingly, the process was already underway. That was one of the few times in Iran when something happened without us making it happen. He told us that the photocopy of the request had already gone to the central bank. We left some documents with him, we had a signed letter of agreement with Bank Omran we left for his review, and we had to be back at his office at noon. And Keane and I went down to the central bank to follow up on the approval process.

KF: Which was at what street?

JH: Well, I don't remember the address but it was further down town. And that was a scary, not so much as a difficult crowd, but alot of traffic stop and go traffic and exercised a few manovers that'd get him in jail in most countries.

KF: Such as.

JH: U-turns in the middle of the street, cutting cross lanes of traffic, normal Iran driving really, but he was very aggressive about it. We got downtown. .

KF: Did you see any fighting?

JH: I don't remember any particular fighting there. There was the chance at this point in time that if we'd had an accident or bumped fenders or something like that, that we might run into an anti-American crowd. But, no particular hostile activity. We got down to the central bank. There was a wait until we could get in to see the guy, and finally, he stuck his

head out and said, oh, you're on the Bank Omran thing, that's already been approved. Again, we were surprised the process was working without our instance. So, we got back in the car and go back to Bank Omran. Got there shortly after noon, again it was a difficult drive back because of traffic problems. But this time, it was more fighting, more shots around the country. You noted that there was a hospital near Bank Omran and as we got near Bank Omran there were more ambulances and make-shift ambulances, people honking and making xx. Alot of traffic, alot of people running down the street, both people that were wounded and I forget the symbol now, but some symbol, I think maybe a white handkerchief on a car indicates that you were going to donate blood, and that type of activity. But not like we were caught in a cross-fire itself.

KF: You didn't see any shooting on this day?

JH: I don't think we saw any shooting.

KF: Did you see fires? Buildings burning, cars burning?

JH: I don't believe we saw anything real close, there was some smoke plumes, not nearly as much as the next day, but there was some of that. And we heard a lot of shooting. We got back to Baktiar's office a little after noon. At that time we met the bank's lawyer, a Dr. Hemani was what his name was. It was the first time we'd come across him. He had come up with a few minor changes to the letter of credit document. None of which caused grave concern except for the timing aspect of it. We had thought that this was the day, we had central bank approval and everything would be done. We got back to central bank and there is yet another step. So, after a little brief discussion as to whether we can avoid that, and deciding we really can't. I guess we really resolved the issues of the letter of credit, to talk about the procedures to get that done. We tried to discuss with him our signed letter that we had provided for that he had not had a chance to look at it and said that he would do so.

KF: Now, did you, when you went to Bank Omran with the, or having been told that

at the central bank that it was approved, did you then think that you'd be able to get Paul and Bill out that day?

JH: Yes. That day. We thought that that day was the day that we could develop xx.

KF: Now, what was, if you had to make changes in the wording of the letter of credit, you had to have that translated into Farsi and didn't it have to . . .

JH: Yes, we had to go through the same chain. That was the big disappointment of the day was when we got back.

KF: And there were more changes.

JH: On the basis of previous occasions, we thought central bank approval was the final dotting of the i. And that's why we were down there early, we were going to sheppard that process through, as soon as we could get it through, we were going to get the letter guaranteed, we were going to get Paul and Bill out of jail that day, and then worry about how to get them out of the country. We had still not gotten a resolution that they could legally leave the country, but we wanted to get them out of jail because of the deteriorating conditions. The first time we found out that, so far the day had been going great with the last thing that had to be taken place was happening without us -- a pleasant surprise. The bank, we felt kind of silly driving back and forth around downtown Tehran for nothing because it was, the process was ahead of us. And then we got back to Bank Omran and the world kind of fell apart again. We were not about to be handed the letter of guarantee as we thought. The lawyer was just reviewing it, he had these fairly minor changes. The separate document we discussed with Farhad, Farhad had no problem with, the lawyer hadn't even looked at it and he would need to look at it. We were at least a several day delay to get the changes through the banking . .

KF: Was anything said in reaction to that news?

JH: Oh, yeah. We made our displeasure apparent, but it was . .

KF: Do you remember what you said?

JH: I don't remember anything specific. It was not a real outburst kind of thing, it's just not the way that you accomplish things. It was more, you know, low key disappointment type of thing. Is there anything we can do about it and there really wasn't. You know, it was something we couldn't force them to do. Then we found out also that Farhad would need to get a couple of more signatures from the board of directors and he thought he could do that at the board of directors meeting in the morning. And then he would need to check the references at the National Bank of Commerce. I guess we were using the National Bank of Commerce itself to Bank Omran. We gave him some references, again it's three more steps than we thought we had to do. So, xxxx left it, he was going to get the board of directors signatures at the board of directors meeting the next morning, we were going to try to get the changes to the telex through Dubi by tomorrow and that Dubi would call tomorrow afternoon and confirm the telex. I asked about doing it sooner but there was a holiday and Dubi, he was going to Geneva for five days and two of his assistants would take over the matter while he left and we tried to say, look, can't we get it all done now, but no. We tried to get a meeting set up the following day, the 11th, but they were, not even with the insistence adamantly refused. There was a strike or something. They were afraid that if they even showed up for work it would be bad news. So that was kind of it. That's where our day fell apart and we were left with the logistics of getting the letter of telex revised, the hopefully formal matter of getting the board of directors signatures and to get the lawyer to sign off on this side letter agreement. The discussions got interrupted, as you indicate by the early curfew that was declared mid-afternoon and everybody started evaporating. We were still trying to work on this. The lawyer in particular, disappeared. And we were hoping we could go over the letter agreement and that something we were doing directly in Tehran, we did not go through any commands that were open, because that was of our decision.

KF: The side letter. He just disappeared; did he say anything?

JH: I've got to go. He gave me his phone number, though I think I'd already gotten those. One of the things we learned to do is to get phone numbers early on since there's no directory or anything like that. So, he said, call me later about it and then he disappeared.

KF: Did you know that it was an early curfew?

JH: Yes, yes.

KF: How did you learn? Pardon me, you said a secretary stuck her head in and said that?

JH: Yeah. I don't remember that specifically, but it was something like that. The word spread through the office. And there were some sirens going on that I remember. Things were taking a significant turn for the worse.

KF: Good.

JH: The middle of page 192 you have a reference to Howell and Taylor often had to find the homes of senior officials and hold meetings with them there. And I've heard that, xxxx in a lot of different context but I'm not aware of any meetings in the homes of senior officials. There were telephone calls.

KF: That one comes from Ross.

JH: I've frequently heard him describe it that way.

KF: Oh, I see.

JH: But I don't believe there were any meetings in homes, alot of telephone calls though.

KF: Okay, okay. Now then, I've got a couple of little questions here on this section, 187 - 193. Have you gone past that?

JH: Yes.

KF: Well, now how did you deal with this frustration on an emotional level?

JH: Probably not very well. There was one occasion and I don't remember exactly the occurrence, but it was a meeting at the SSO building, probably with Dadgar, where frustrations built up, and a number of us, close to tears, just kinda let our frustrations out. You know, we can't get anything done. That was before this particular point in time. I was getting pretty edgy, edgier than I would like, because that does not, anger and overt emotions don't go over well in Iran. So, I was trying to control that because it was counterproductive and I remember having to exert more effort to do that. The tendency would be to go off the handle and tell him what you think about him and that wouldn't accomplish anything. This particular day I don't remember any great emotional reaction, really, it was one of the most disappointing days, but I remember the disappointment, but not so much an outrage. I guess I'd gotten a little bit numb to it by then. It was just one more occasion where things had fallen apart. So, it was a great sense of disappointment. Some, outrage is too strong a word, disappointment that really people didn't care enough to try to resolve it while it was so close to our grasp. It was more of a resignation, well, at least we're one more step nearer and maybe by tomorrow, well not tomorrow, the people won't meet, well maybe the day after tomorrow we'll get together and get this whole thing resolved.

KF: Okay. It never occurred to you throughout all this to get on a plane and go home?

JH: No.

KF: The thought never crossed your mind?

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JH: No.

KF: Okay.

JH: It wasn't that simple. Well, I guess I could have got a cab or something and gone to the airport. No, never really did. Just not one of the alternatives that was considered.

KF: Okay.

Rashid

JH: Page 194, you're talking about [REDACTED] preparatory to the prison assault. Rumors that the xx prison had been stormed last night. But that was the next night, that was primarily the thing we watched the night of the 11. The xx prison was just up the hill from the Hyatt Hotel. The xx Hotel was right across the parking lot and the xx prison was a little bit up there. And the xx of the xx prison, at least from my understanding, was that that's what the building was and what was going on and what we watched most of the previous night.

KF: The following night.

JH: The following night.

KF: I think that was the armory. There was a prison and then there was an armory.

JH: Well, could well be. I don't independently know the buildings, but that's what people were telling me.

KF: You watched people coming out with alot of weaponry or somebody did.

JH: You said I did, but . . .

KF: Oh, okay. Well, we'll get to that in just a minute.

JH: Yes, we will.

Rashid KF: Okay, I think it's a fact that the prisoners were let out of the xx prison on the night of the 10th to the 11th. And I've put the rumors said, because I don't see how anybody could have known for certain at the time. ■■■■ knows now but I don't think he could have known then. That's why I say a rumor. But after the event, when people piece it together, I'm pretty sure of that.

JH: I would have put that the next day and it would surprise me a little bit if that major an event had happened then because, you remember the morning of the 11th it was, to some degree, business as usual. We went down to Dadgar's office, visit with him. The things, despite the early curfew from the day before, things didn't seem to really start falling apart until say about noon, on Sunday the 11th.

KF: Okay, well I'll xx check that.

Rashid

JH: The description on 195 about ■■■■ talking about the people in there are prisoners of the, the word that comes to my mind is the old regime.

KF: Okay.

JH: The xxx regime doesn't xx that specific since they were really kinda two at that point in time. Something that's a seemed a little internally consistent and I don't know exactly what is the case, but on page 200, there's xx about getting out of prison, what should they do, stay there and all that. And later they get out and try to figure out where to go. In a previous reference to Simons telling somebody to communicate to them when they get out, go to the Hyatt.

KF: Yeah. I talked to Paul about that.

JH: It was my impression that this is accurate that they didn't know where to go when they got out and they xx at the Hyatt and made that decision themselves.

KF: Well, I don't know whether they remember very clearly either, but it's got to be something I've got to sort out.

JH: Page 203, the discussion of the Mahvi situation. I don't know how much you wanted to develop that, but it seemed a little bit inaccurate. You know, I don't know if we ever learned of the notorious illegal middle-man king of the 5%ers, I've heard kind of rumors to that but from what had been personally told to me, he had been no more than a successful and influential Iranian businessman. Brother of a general, I'd never heard of that. That he had demanded a share of all EDS subsequent profits in the country, that's not probably an accurate characterization. Probably he had demanded to be equal partners in all of EDS' subsequent business in the country would be a little bit more accurate.

KF: Okay.

JH: We handed Dadgar a twelve page document, but it was in English; it was not a Farsi translation of it. There was a cover letter in Farsi.

KF: Okay.

Abolhasan

JH: And so [REDACTED] read the paper, translating as he read, translated into Farsi. The phone call from the office there, I didn't receive that, and I think that probably [REDACTED] did. I think the phone rang and Dadgar answered it and handed it to, [REDACTED] said something in Farsi that I didn't understand, and handed it to [REDACTED]. So I was kinda sitting there listening to one side of the conversation and picking up a little bit of what it was about. And then [REDACTED] talked to Dadgar in Farsi, so it was after the fact that I got filled in on what the whole conversation was. But I think the substance is accurate. On page 206, the description of the scene back at the

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JH: Bucharest office, had a little bit left out that you may want to add. When we first got back, most of the folks were up on the roof to see more. And looking around at the fires and hearing alot of shots. And then there were a couple of suspicious xx nearby that, couldn't place it exactly, but it we determined they were bullets passing by not very far away. We decided that was not the best place to be. We went down to the offices and this was when we saw the guys running by with guns and decided to get out of here. The description of the phone call from ██████^{Rashid} to Keane on 207 was a little bit more coherent than I remember it as. As I remember it, Keane was kinda half asleep and one of the problems we had, is he really didn't know what was said on the phone call, we thought it was about Paul and Bill.

KF: I see.

JH: Didn't really know it was Reza. One thing is, I made a note here, you have Gayden calling Dallas, you got Tom Walter. I doubt that is the case. The logistics was such it was very difficult to get a call from Tehran to the United States. You had to book it several hours in advance. And so, what we did, by and large, was have the United States call Tehran at whatever place we kind of scheduled, of every few hours. And, during this period of time, this afternoon we had an open line going and I don't remember how early it happened, but things were happening in Tehran in general. The United States had called to, I'm not sure if it was Bill Gayden's group, for some reason I think it might have been the room next to it for some reason, but anyway, so we a kind of open line all during this period of time, which in the early stages, the afternoon was kind of bed time, we were just telling them about how many fires we could see and this, that and the other. But you've got several people calling several people during this period of time, when really it was just one long phone call.

KF: Okay.

JH: That's another aspect of the, both the evacuation and the jail rescue episode that is missing in some ways, is the degree in which we used that technique of just having a telephone line open for three or four hours. In particular, this is the same day, this is after the, this

JH: went on after the Simons and the other people left the hotel; we got the line open all night long and I got to be the one that ended up with the phone on my ear when people kinda went to bed and all that. So, I laid on the couch with the damn thing stuck to my ear all night.

KF: Was there anything about this drive from the Bucharest street office to the Hyatt Hotel?

JH: The evening of the, or the afternoon of the 11th?

KF: Yeah.

JH: Nothing in particular. It was, there was somewhat of a tense situation because everything was falling apart, there was no place where somebody put a gun to our head, but, there was the feeling that the whole structure was coming apart.

KF: Well, what was giving you that feeling?

JH: We'd just been up on the roof watching it happen. We had seen a whole lot more activity than we'd seen previously. A lot of fires, a lot of shots; we'd heard the bullets come by our heads -- not within two inches of our ears, but somewhere in the proximity. We'd seen the kids running down the streets with guns. There was a lot of traffic and traffic jams and things and people trying to get places and there was just kind of a feeling that everything was coming unglued and more of a sense of the unknown than any particular danger that you could identify.

KF: Okay. Once again, you didn't see shooting?

JH: I don't remember any specific shooting on the way. By and large, that type of activity was more to the south. The EDS office was half way north and the hotel was, I would say the northwest, I think you call it to the northeast. I don't know Tehran well enough to second guess you on that, but I think of it as more to the northwest of Tehran. And so, we

JH: were going away from the real activity. So we had more congested traffic and that kind of disorganization rather than any . . .

KF: How did you feel after this phone call from ^{Rashid} [REDACTED]? Would you feel hopeful then?

JH: Yes, I guess, hopeful, anticipatory -- we didn't know really what it meant. But, we thought that what it meant, we had, through some elementary triangular we could see some pretty heavy smoke and other activity in the prison area. And so we were apprehensive of that safety factor, what was going on down there. And this phone call came through, and there was a period of, gosh I don't know how long, may be an hour or so till

Rashid [REDACTED] showed up, that we were trying to figure out what it could mean and speculating all sorts of things around the prison being overrun and them out and this that and the other. But, nobody knew exactly what had happened. Okay, on 2/12 and 2/13, we got the story out of ^{Rashid} [REDACTED], when

Rashid [REDACTED] originally showed up, his plan was to find out exactly where they were -- he did not previously know exactly what cell they were in. And then to borrow a car and go back down as opposed to, I think that Taylor asking him or somebody, asked him to go back. It was his original plan. And he was going back by himself; Taylor as I remember it, did not leave the room. ^{Rashid} [REDACTED] was the one that went down the hall and saw Paul and Bill; we were still in the room on the telephone trying to explain to Dallas what we just learned from Reza and keep track of that. Then, as I ^{Rashid} remember, which is somewhat vague, I don't remember [REDACTED] coming back in and saying they're here. I remember the door opening and them being there, kind of a big surprise.

KF: Yes.

JH: We had no idea they were anywhere near the hotel.

KF: What were your feelings at this point, when they walked in?

JH: Overjoyed. That's what we'd been trying to achieve for, you know, the last month. Did you check whether there might sort of a recording of that phone conversation?

KF: Yeah, I have that. I haven't got the recording, I've got the transcript.

JH: Okay.

KF: Did you say anything? Do you remember what you said?

JH: Oh, I'm sure I did. I don't remember anything specific. Everybody was shaking hands, hugging, glad to have you back, you know, what happened, general conversation. I don't remember anything specific. I think I was probably less in the forefront of that than some of the other people, some of the, you know, more direct friends. On top of page 219 you have Simons telling Gayden, I guess, that he's going to move everybody out, but don't tell the others until the morning. I don't know if he, that's the directives he gave, but we pretty soon had the same message. We all knew that evening that we were going to be leaving the next morning.

KF: Okay. How did everybody feel about it?

JH: Oh, I guess everybody was anxious to be doing something. Our objective was achieved and we were ready to move on out of there. I guess there was some minor discussion, really not that much, about staying that evening, should we all go at once, but that was fine. Originally, I think the concept we all stay that evening in the hotel and leave and then Simons and the others had left and it seemed perfectly all right if we just stay in the nice hotel one more night and leave the next morning. A little bit of feeling that maybe was an overreaction to having a charade of just going to the office and all that, we might as well pack up and leave at that time.

KF: Who felt that was an overreaction, you?

JH: Oh, I guess I probably did. It wasn't anything I gave a great thought to, but if it had been me, I'd probably just packed my suitcase and checked out and gone home. I remember the next morning, I played the game pretty much by the rules and I had a good gold chain from my wife or something, I slipped in my pocket, didn't leave in my suitcase. I would not normally have taken it to the office. Rich and Kathy ended up with about 3 or 4 bags, that they didn't look like they were going to the office much, but. You know, it seemed to us, general impression maybe, little more extra effort than need be, but that was fine, no big deal.

KF: Was it a relief when you got to the Dvoranchik house?

JH: Oh, I suppose a little bit of relief. The trip over was fairly uneventful. We had the xx, Poche was in the parking lot and Coburn was somewhere along the way in the other range rover and was kinda covering it, but we were more sightseeing than anything else on the trip, looking around and seeing what happened, and there were burned out cars along the way where roadblocks had been. Really, the trip was uneventful. Just minor logisticals. xx we spread out and we all ended up all bunched up together in arriving at the house at the same time or something we weren't supposed to. But it was nice being back together. That was the, I guess the main impression I get, other than the brief reunion there in the hotel and then we split in separate rooms and then they left and then we spent the night kind of watching the action and dozing off and on. It was now, we're all back together. It was a warm feeling. I already mentioned to you that you quote me seeing this stream of orange colored Tehran taxis xx -- I don't remember that at all. I do remember the activity during the evening which I thought was, a prison, lot of fighting going on there, but I don't remember a stream of weapons being brought out.

KF: It must have been Keane who saw that.

JH: Could be.

JH: On the, I guess page 232, you're at the point where Simons decided to split the group. As I remember it, it was something Simons and Gayden went away and talked about and came back kind of announced as opposed to Simons and Coburn and Poche, but I don't remember that very distinctly. And on 233, the paragraph near the top about splitting up the team, I don't remember it occurred exactly that way, it was kind of announced as a decision and then the decision was discussed, but it was a situation where we discussed it and arrived at a decision, it was kind of announced to us -- the decision and what did people think about it. And we discussed it that way, and nobody had any particular problems with it. I think I raised an issue of the rationale for dividing the people the way they did.

KF: Okay.

Majid's

JH: The scene on 234 about Coburn going to, I guess [REDACTED] house, having
Majid tea, and [REDACTED] saying I have to kill xx, was a surprise to me; I've never
Majid heard that before but Jay's obviously the best source there. I know that
[REDACTED] kind of backed out then. Okay, on the going to Lou Goelz's house, I
guess it was generally described on page 235, that was a situation when we
decided to split up and xx Coburn, I mean Gayden and Poche had gone over
to Goelz's house to describe that to him. At that time, as I remember,
Goelz did invite us to stay at his house. We decided to decline that
offer. Simons felt we would be safer in the Embassy and general concensus
was that we would safer in the Embassy waiting for the evacuation flights.
So, what we intended to do when we left the Goelz's house was to go, to
stop at Goelz's house, tell him we were going to the Embassy, but it was
still not, we hadn't told him that was what we were going to do, and to
check on the procedures we're going over to the Embassy. By the time we
got to Goelz's house it was pretty late in the evening and he said, well
it may be pretty crowded over there. Why you just stay here for xx, xx
impose upon you, so at least stay here tonight, I'm going on over to the
Embassy tomorrow morning, I'll check on things, make sure the accommodations

JH: available, and you can come over tomorrow. So we said okay. And that's what we did. We spent the night there and the next day when Goelz went over is when the Embassy was taken for the first time. So, until then we had planned on going to the Embassy and then we decided to stay at Goelz's house. On page 241 you note that Perot had no title with EDS.

KF: Yeah, I realize that was a mistake. He was Chairman of the Board.

JH: Page 252, the call from Tom Walter. I believe it's Joe Poche.

KF: Okay.

Gholam

JH: [REDACTED] is referred to in various places here. The way I normally see his name spelled is [REDACTED]. It's a phoenetic spelling so it's hard to say what's right and what's wrong.

Gholam's

KF: Now then, how did you feel when you had Kathy's, or rather [REDACTED] story about the hotel room being shot up.

JH: That surprised me a good bit. It was third-hand so the details weren't that accurate, but it was clear that something had happened at the hotel and xxxxx were ruins. And I didn't know why. The one thing that occurred to me is that, two things that we had in our luggage, people had been staying at the hotel, I didn't realize at that time I don't believe, but eventually Coburn and Poche had left some luggage there and that should have been on a separate floor. xxxxx on separate floor and I don't know what they may have had in their luggage that might have upset the revolutionaries, but we had in our luggage both some recorders like the one you're using with suction microphones to stick to telephones and some other minor electronic equipment that we had used for dictating informati-n back and forth, but it might have looked fairly like a spy. And also, we had picked up at one of the homes some toy that very realistically could be walki-talkies that he had picked up one time when we were making a liquor run. It was used for playing in the hotel and I think those were the xxx,

- JH: so I guess my personal speculation xxx going through the luggage, that seeing those things might have set off a rampage. I did not, I really have conceived of the assault on the room as being specifically directed to EDS as far as the search for Paul and Bill. In my mind it's more of the revolutionaries going through hotel, ransacking rooms, harrassing people and finding some things in our rooms, it could have been Gayden's bar that they took exception to.
- KF: What about the others, what did Joe and Rich and Kathy Gallagher say about that report?
- JH: I don't remember anything specific. Joe was not very communicative in the whole episode for that matter. Kathy was the one telling the story that she heard from ██████^{Gholam} and I don't remember any editorial comments along the way. She was just pretty much relating it. What I xx, that little bit about what was done to our luggage was supposedly scattered everywhere and we wondered where various things were. XX finally speculated that he'd never see the gold jewelry he'd gotten for his wife, which was true.
- KF: Who was it?
- JH: Bob Young?
- KF: Oh, Bob Young. Oh, of course, he's there now.
- JH: Yes. Was Sullivan a very willing interviewee?
- KF: Willing, yeah. Difficult to know how much to believe. He's a man that's quite good at . . .
- JH: He's a diplomat.
- KF: Yeah. And also, I think, quite good at covering up his own mistakes.

JH: The discussion, I guess, at the bottom of page 256 and 257, about the telecommunication -- As I understand the situation, when the Embassy was first overrun, the Embassy had destroyed its communications xx that it would normally send telexes and telephone. As a result of that, the U.S. Government had commanded all the telephone lines and that was the result, our communications were effectively cut off. I had some hesitation when I saw you mentioned Ray Johnson, the EDS account manager for AT&T. Previously, our xxx had some dealings with Ray and he evidently went to some fairly great extremes to help us back in contact, the extremes he would prefer, I think, not to be bandied about. I did not know that ISIRAN was widely believed to have close xx with the secret police of xx government company, but I did not know that it was supposed to be connected with SAVAK. I guess there's a question mark on the bottom of page 263, it's not a Blue Cross but it's our health card that Keane Taylor showed, it's really an EDS identification card. EDS has it's self-insured health plan, I believe. Have you seen the employee benefit book? It's got the Keane Taylor card on the cover so you can see what it looks like.

KF: Oh, okay. If I just call that a health insurance card.

JH: An EDS health insurance card, right. Or health insurance card.

KF: It works like a credit card, doesn't it? That's what you use to pay your bills.

JH: Well, yes, it does in effect. Well, an identification card is what it is. It indicates that you've got health insurance.

KF: Don't they put it in a machine.

JH: Normally not.

KF: Oh, I see.

JH: I found the story about Glen Jackson, flying over Tehran interesting. I'd never been aware of that aspect of it. I don't have many comments on the cross-country run here.

KF: How did you feel about Joe Poche? You said he was uncommunicative.

JH: I didn't mean that in a negative sense. It's just he was not a very verbal person who would sit down and gossip alot. I had not previously known him, and I guess the first time I'd met him was at Dvoranchik's house. I may have just seen him, maybe shaking his hand that evening at the hotel, but I'd never met him before. So, we didn't have alot of just friendly gossiping to do.

KF: Okay.

JH: Okay, I'm over to 320, which I guess picks up the Clean Team.

KF: Yeah.

JH: The discussion about the first or second evacuation flight, or whether or not to take the first evacuation flight is a little bit out of focus, in that . . . What we understood, there was a series of evacuation flights. The first one would be that Saturday and then presumably on a daily basis. I don't know if they were carried out that way or not. And, the discussion was one of whether we take the first one, when the confusion factor was the highest or whether we scope out the first one to see what the procedure is. And, take the next one. The advantage being that we would know more about what the procedures are, the disadvantage being that they would know what the procedures are too. So, it was not a matter of whether to take that flight or wait until another flight might come. We were presuming there would be another flight in the next day or two. It was just a matter of evaluating the . . . take advantage of the confusion or try to see what the procedures would be. The message from Angela on the bottom of page 320

JH: and 321. First of all, chronologically it's out of context. I don't know if you meant to imply that it was xx this period of time. This was, I don't know exactly when it was, but it was probably two or three weeks earlier than this. It was probably late January, kind of in the middle of the whole episode. And, the characterization of it being a, in effect, an angry message is probably not accurate. It was again, a situation with an open line on xx, one of the regular calls and passing information back and forth. They would connect the line with various people and see if they had any messages, and so one time management was put on the line and I think we were in the office, and I wasn't there. And so, she just left a message. She may have left the message through EDS, she may have not directly talked to the Tehran office, but I think it's a mischaracterization to have it come across as an angry message and a hanging up afterwards.

KF: Sure?

JH: Yeah, I'm pretty sure. I think in context it was a, if you will, not a real pleased situation, but more of a kind of a humorous message and an upset message. That's the way I interpreted it when I got it.

KF: I see, alright, you didn't . . . did you feel no pressure from her by the, in reality or in your imagination to get out of there and go home? That's why I brought it up at the point where you have to decide whether to go immediately.

JH: Yeah. But that, see the immediacy wasn't the factor there. Another day or two didn't make that much difference.

KF: Well, that may be how you felt, but how did she feel?

JH: I think she probably felt the same. I mean, at that time, it wasn't a matter of whether we left on a Saturday or a Sunday; it was not that big of a deal, which was the safest procedure. She, of course, would have been, preferred me not to be there all along.

JOHN HOWELL

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KF: Almost done. We're supposed to have lunch.

JH: At 321, we're almost done.

[Ross Perot] RP: At page 321, Well you, I mean this is good Texarkana guy.

KF: Is he?

RP: You know John Howell's from Texarkana.

KF: Is that why he's so short?

JH: Short on stature, long on guts.

RP: Okay, Herbs ready whenever you are. I'm going to let you and Tom Luce have lunch together. I've gone on down to the cafeteria and had a bite. I just thought it was a little more xx.

KF: Yeah.

RP: Okay?

[Tom Luce] TL: I still need to see you for about 2, when you get through, I need to see you for about 2 minutes before you all go to lunch, okay?

KF: Terrific.

TL: On your long list of things that you need alot of my time with, what's going to be the toughest question for me to answer and I'll start to work on it. That't what I want to ask you.

TL: So, when you come in, bring your list, then, what I'll start doing is just, you know, dictating alot of details rather than just kind of rambling around with you in person. We'll start with the document that we worked on okay.

KF: Good.

JH: That was the context, I don't remember any particular pressure from Angela, you know, come home any particular time for any particular event. When I got that message I was sorry I wasn't there to see Michael walking, he'd been tottering around holding onto the furniture the last time I'd seen him, so it wasn't a great xx. Buying the house was one that concerned me a little bit more; what were we getting ourselves into. The paragraph at the top of page 321, I wasn't quite sure, he decided to go but he remained unhappy about the decision. I'd like to know what unhappy was supposed to have meant.

KF: Well it was supposed to be that xx really didn't, still didn't know what right decision was.

JH: I'm sure, but we briefly discussed that in I think it was consensus to go ahead and get on the first flight. There, some feeling was xx better, and that was one of the factors, but a fairly minor factor. The bigger factor was that we'd have the best shot of going through the massive confusion with a minimal ripple. Maybe uneasy about . . .

KF: Rather than unhappy, okay.

JH: Page 322. About the evacuees organized by company and EDS was on the Frankfurt bound, it's true the evacuees organized by company but we had specifically not organized ourselves as a company. We were not traveling under the EDS banner and we were treated as Embassy personnels; one thing Goelz had arranged for us. So, when they started talking about groups, we said Embassy personnel. We just included ourselves with that.

KF: Okay.

JH: I don't remember the crowd of reporters and television crews on the bus route from the airport. I don't remember seeing that kind of activity. The little thing in the middle of page 323 about our passports missing, I don't . . .

KF: Don't recall that?

JH: Don't recall that. I do remember we were all picking up our passports and it was mass confusion, a thousand people and there was trouble trying to figure out where it was and some xx, but I don't remember something as definitive about our five being set aside on the shelf somewhere. 323, 324, and based on our little airport discussion, it's a little bit out of order. Airport tax was the first thing we would have done and then the passport control and the search for the cash was as we got to the gates, kind of the last thing.

KF: Right. There's also, that reminded me, there was a boarding pass check there. When you go into the corridor before you get to airport taxes, there's a boarding pass check there.

JH: Yes.

KF: Right.

JH: Passengers only beyond this point. 327, we're talking about the luggage being checked on the plane. My memory of that is primarily that Kathy Gallagher ended up with almost all our baggage checks. We had found our baggage the night before at the Embassy and had to put tags on it and for some reason or another, she ended up with most of them in her purse or whatever she had. And at that time, I do not know if she had picked xxx Paul, John and William, Demming I think it is for xx. And I was afraid that if they called out one of our numbers that she would identify it to ... I was trained to signal to her not to even look at our baggage checks. They'd call off numbers and she'd sit there shuffling through our baggage checks and I was trying to signal to her across half a 747 to please not to identify any baggage if they happened to call one of our numbers.

KF: Why?

JH: Because I, just because the less we could do to avoid being conspicuous, the better off we were. I didn't want any of us to have to get up and walk across

JH: the plane or do anything that somebody might say, hey I know you.

KF: I see.

JH: I couldn't think of anything we might have in our suitcases that would justify the risk.

KF: Okay. At this point, what was your worst, as it were, your worst fantasy? That's a rather tense situation; you're sitting, you know they're looking for Paul and Bill.

JH: The worst fantasy is it, had been since the, I guess shortly after the jail break, especially after we split up was that we'd get picked up by the authorities of Dadgar on, I don't know how to phrase it in Iran, but assisting in a jail break. Again, I had a feeling that we were somehow on the other side of the law. Our halo of innocence that I had previously relied upon was now somewhat tarnished. I didn't have any problems with, more problems with what we were doing but I did realize that we were probably now in a situation where we had violated Iranian law and some valid charges in assisting in a jail break and obstruction of justice or whatever or how they might phrase it would be valid. So I could easily see the situation where we got picked up, all of us got picked up and interrogated about the jail break and Paul and Bill and got thrown in the pokie with Bill. Assisting in jail break charges.

KF: Did you imagine how that might happen; somebody walking on the plane. . .

JH: Yeah, I guess my thought was, to go back in time xx something that I don't know if I previously mentioned to you. The time that we were, decided to split and the dirty team was going overland and we were going to stay and go to the Embassy, I raised the issue and didn't get too much interest, but I was very interested in those of staying having a consistent and believable story so that if and when we got interrogated that we could all tell the same story instead of what events had transpired since then and that. The only

JH: particular that I remember getting a resolution of is, my approach would be that, the nearer we stayed to the truth, the better off we were in being able to tell consistent stories and so my proposal was that our story be that we had, gone to the hotel as we had, we'd stay there that night as we had. This in effect, omitting the Paul and Bill showing up aspect of it, that we decided the situation at the hotel was potentially dangerous because of the revolutionaries going around looking for foreigners so we decided to go to a safehouse and we go to Dvoranchik's house and we had stayed there until Tuesday, it was the time we'd gone to the Goelz's. In fact, that's exactly what happened, just leaving out any mention of Paul, Bill or Simons, those folks. The feeling was that would be too great of an exposure to Bill Dvoranchik's landlady who still lived there. And if people, if they would come, checking the story, they'd come and find all sorts of contraband, gear, 55 gallon drums of gasoline and stuff like that and it would be dangerous to her so we changed the story somewhat to say we'd all gone to Keane Taylor's house and spent the time there. I wasn't as comfortable with that because deviating from truth, they're more likely to trip us up in interrogation. But I, that was, at that point in time I saw that as the risk xx in Tehran. I thought, out of the most likely place that would occur would be at the airport. At the, probably the passport control point. I was very afraid that Dadgar or some of his staff would be there doing a visual check for us. I wasn't that concerned about us xx , because I didn't think that the bureaucratic mechanism would work that well. But I thought that it would be pretty easy for Dadgar, couple of policemen or the equivalents, to be there standing by as we, different line, there weren't that many, maybe four or five lines, you know, looking at passport pictures looking for people they'd recognize. And he would have recognized me. He would have recognized Bob Young. He probably would have recognized Keane, xxxxx Keane wasn't with us. He probably would have recognized Rich Gallaher just from seeing the office, he had no dealings with Rich. He would not have recognized Kathy or Joe Poche because, the three of us had a good chance, especially me and Bob that he would recognize. That's what I thought was the most likely for him to try to do. And the thing on the airplane with the passport check on the airplane, I was kind of flabbergasted when figured out xxxxx he'd been able to orchestrate and I'm still kind of

JH: amazed that is probably an even more effective way of checking people. Once you get them seated and go around person to person. That's probably even more effective than a passport control situation. Maybe people slip through without being checked.

KF: But if he had walked onto the plane rather than other people or . . .

JH: Several of his people on his staff or some of the Ministry employees that had been working with him. There were a number of adverse people that would have recognized us. And I would guess that the result would be that we would be placed under arrest and interrogated for our part in the jail break and escape from justice thereafter. And part of that that may be more personally uncomfortable is, while in the overall scheme of justice, I think it was the thing to do as far as Iranian law, I think we probably would have been on the other side of the boundary.

KF: Page 328.

JH: Yes sir.

KF: You departed Iranian airspace. The passengers gave a weary cheer. How did you feel?

JH: I think it was a little more than a weary cheer. It was a very enthusiastic cheer. I felt pretty enthusiastic. I was very relieved. Unfortunately, the plane was almost devoid of alcoholic beverages. I think we found about a beer a piece. No, it was a great relief. We discussed at some point during the time after people got up and started milling around after we got out of Iran airspace . . .

END OF TAPE 74