

TAPE #18--SIDE A  
JOHN HOWELL

- JH           <sup>Abolhasan</sup>  
Right. So [REDACTED] when in to this conference room that Dadgar was in and said, Dadgar, I'd like you to meet John Howell, the attorney for EDS in the United States, he would like to visit with you. And Dadgar said...we went into a conference table in Paul Chiapparone's office, the three of us sat there...
- KF           Okay, describe Dadgar.
- JH           He is fairly short in the 5'5", 5'6" range I would say. Fairly heavy set.
- KF           Age.
- JH           Age, late 40's I would guess.
- KF           Mustache, beard?
- JH           I believe he has a mustache, dark hair Iranian appearance.
- KF           Glasses.
- JH           No glasses.
- KF           Dressed how?
- JH           Dressed in a business suit, fairly well dressed by Iranian standards. Iranians, while, even though wearing a coat and tie do not seem to have much sense of what I'd call style, plaids and stripes and dots, and all, they mix pretty much interchangeably, but by Iranian standards he was fairly well dressed. Polite, attentive to detail. I'm not sure if I can think of any other descriptive adjectives that come to mind.

JH      After some indirect remarks, we had a conversation that was through  
Abolhasan [REDACTED], I speak no Farsic, and he speaks, or at least appeared  
to speak no English. I had no indication that he understands anything  
more than hello. So [REDACTED] was serving as an interpreter. There is a  
footnote here, I'll jump ahead for a minute. After our first couple of  
meeting he made it clear to [REDACTED] that he did not like being  
interrogated, he did not like being questioned. And we changed the  
format of our meetings so that [REDACTED] and I would visit before hand  
about the things we were trying to accomplish and areas we are trying  
to cover, and then we would go into a meeting and [REDACTED] would just  
have a conversation with him in Farsic. And I would be a, at least a  
neutral observer. And then we would debrief [REDACTED] later on as  
opposed to a translation question and answer type session.

But going back to the first meeting, I started out explaining that we'd  
done nothing wrong, that EDS had done nothing wrong, these people  
had done nothing wrong, and we were a reputable, respected  
company, and we were willing to cooperate with this investigation in  
any reasonable way we could get our people out of prison. His first  
reaction, and I think it's a consistent reaction, that comes through in  
several different respects, was he was surprised that EDS had not  
already posted bail. I think he, for some reason, expected on the 28th  
of December for him to establish a 13 million dollar bail for EDS to say  
fine, here's a check for Paul Chiapparone and Bill Gaylord to walk out  
of his office and go about their business. I'm not sure why he thought  
that might happen that easily, but I think there was genuine surprise  
that day or the next day that something like that did not happen. I  
guess I gave him two answers to that general area of inquiry by him.  
One was as we previously discussed, the fact that even though EDS  
was assured that it had done nothing wrong, and was sure that any  
investigation would establish that, that would not protect the bail,  
because the bail was not conditioned upon the credence of EDS, but  
upon whether Paul Chiapparone and Bill Gaylord would come back to  
stand trial, or something, on an undesignated time in the future. Also  
try to explain to him a potential legal problem that EDS as a publicly

JH traded company in the United States had in using corporate funds, in cont. effect, for private benefit. And that the owners of EDS are the shareholders. And they have a right under U.S. law to expect those funds to be used for business purposes, to generate a profit to the corporation that they will benefit from. Posting 13 million dollars bail for two individuals in a foreign country is, at least argued without a proper corporate purpose to expend corporate funds.

*smoke* smoke?

KF Was this a real problem? Or were you just putting up smug?

JH Oh, I think it is a real problem, I think it is one that was not a hinderance at all within EDS, I don't think that would have deterred an EDS decision to post bail. But it was a legal risk, and a substantial legal risk that some little lady in Amarillo owning 10 shares of EDS stock would later file suit saying, I don't know why my portion of that 13 million dollars went to Iran to get these two guys I never met out of jail, it certainly didn't do me any good. I didn't get any dividends from that. But...

KF It does sound to me as you were putting up a smug. *smokescreen* smokescreen

JH I guess the reason, and we discussed this a little bit before hand, that I had taken that approach is trying to lever some logical argument for reducing the amount of the bail. I guess my argument was that there was some business purpose, business justification for getting these managers out of the jail. Just trying to look at the cold, corporate business decision, it was worth while for EDS to have these two guys out of jail. It was something, but not nearly 13 million dollars. It might be expected that argument didn't get very far, got a little technical on U.S. law that Dadgar I don't think appreciated, and I can't see any good came out of it. He got a bit defensive, explained he interrogated Chiapparone and Gaylord, and did only at our insistance, he had not scheduled to be interrogated that quickly, he had been pressured to do so by various people, he resented the pressure, that's a continuing thing that came out of all the political overtures that he's made. But those that had got through to him had

JH     been rejected and if anything antagonized him. He thought he was  
cont. doing us a favor by interrogating at the time he did. A big deal had  
evidentially been made about letting them get out in time to spend New  
Years with their families. He thought he had accommodated that, he  
had had his interrogation, he had set a bail, and he couldn't  
understand why the company hadn't paid the bail. So they could spend  
New Years with their families and we had said that we wanted them to.

KF     But at this point you weren't able to pay the bail.

JH     Exactly.

KF     Could he not understand that?

JH     Yes. Well, at that time we didn't realize how difficult it was. We  
thought that we would be in a situation in a few day to be able to do  
that. The lawyers were at work at that time at Bank Mehli in New  
York setting up the U.S. Banking arrangement, we again, thinking  
simplisticly thought that when that was set up we could go down to  
Bank Mehli Tehran, saying everything is in place, and the United  
States issue our letter. So we thought in a few days we would be in a  
position to pay the bail. And our game in the meantime was trying to  
get it down as small as possible. We did explain some of the difficulties  
that you just don't walk into Tehran with 13 million dollars in your  
pocket...

KF     Still, that was a possibility. I mean, that could have been done.

JH     Presumably, yes. I wouldn't want to be the man carrying the bag, I'll  
say that.

KF     Was that ever discussed?

JH Not in discussion that I was a party to. It was, I guess there were some discussions about whether it would be advantageous to try to get some non-U.S. bank involved in the chain of command, from Europe or something like that.

KF But I mean, why not go to your bank here in Dallas, get 13 million dollars and hundred dollar bills, or thousand dollar bills, or I think you can even get five thousand dollar bills...put them in a suit case and get on the plane?

JH Well, I think that, while theoretically possible is not a...in a situation that I would want to be involved. I wouldn't want to be carrying that much money...

KF Still, it wasn't as dangerous as what Jay and Joe were doing.

JH Well, possibly. I don't know.

KF Jay and Joe were...had a good chance of getting shot.

JH Yes.

KF Now, you are not likely to get shot just because you've got 13 million dollars.

JH We thought, and I think maybe factors caught up with us. We thought we would be in a situation within a short period of time to be able to post the bail from the banking channel. That had the advantage of one not have to carry around that amount of cash, and worry about how do you deposit, how do you get a receipt for it and all that kind of stuff. But also we had the other advantage, that we might be able to interrupt the banking chains in the long run. So I guess there never was, from just a posting the bail point of view, a point in time where it seemed it was not doable through the banking channel. There were continually hurdles to be surmounted, and up until the day before the break we thought we would be able to post the bail through the banking channels and avoid having to deal with currency, per se.

KF Well, you may have. But Ross obviously didn't.

JH Yes, now again, that was the other branch of the operation.

KF At some point Ross must have given Colonel Simons the go. Ross must have decided, without telling you, that this money was never going to go through the banking system. Now my question, and I suppose it's one you can't answer, is that when...I must ask Ross this...When that happened, why did he not have somebody come from Dallas with 13 million dollars in a suit case. Would Dadgar have accepted that as bail?

JH Dadgar would have accepted, I don't know about U.S. dollars, we may have gotten into a currency quibble. He may have wanted us to convert it into Iranian Riyals somewhere along the way. He presumably would have accepted cash, a real estate, or mortgage on real estate, which EDS didn't have any in the country, or a bank guarantee. By and large, the most commonly used was the bank guarantee type, or people that had large estates in Tehran. But we never got to the point where the banking system was not doable.

KF In your opinion.

JH Yes. As a matter of fact I told you a minute ago, I thought on February 10th we would have those guys out of jail. If you had asked me on the morning of February 10 what were the chances of having Paul and Bill out of the jail by posting the bail that evening I would have been up in the 75 to 80 percent range.

KF And you opinion now?

JH My opinion now is that if the revolution had not occurred, there are alot of ifs there, that within a day or two thereafter we would have done that. It was a...Now maybe if we had known in early January that it was going to be so terribly complex a process that it would have taken us a full month to do what ought to be a two or three day job, maybe a different decision up front would have been made. But we never realized at any given time that we were more than a few days away of being able to do that.

KF Tell me about Mr. Mahavive, Dadgar got interested in Mahavive for some reason.

JH Mr. Mahavive is a... at present elderly, wealthy...previously influential Iranian businessman, who had made his way into the business world primarily by introducing western technology to Iran. He reportedly was close to the Shah and the Shah's government, had represented several American businesses in introducing themselves to Iran. When EDS decided to go international back in the mid-'70's had focused on Iran as a likely candidate with EDS' type of business and having enough money, including oil revenue to pay for it, they looked around for vehicles to be introduced to Iran, and Mr. Mahavive's name came to EDS' attention. EDS kind of struck a loose arrangement with him on some unspecified terms they were going to be "partners" in Iran and proceeded to attain EDS' first piece of business in Iran, which was a contract with the Implementation Systems Iran, which had a contract with the Iranian Navy. In the early stages of that it turned out that Mr. Mahavive had been placed on the Iranian black list, which prohibited him from dealing in contracts with the government in some unspecified scope of activity. And so EDS and Mr. Mahavive kind of parted ways for a while. He had been removed from the black list at about the same period of time when EDS was negotiating their contract with the Ministry. And came back to effectively say, remember we are supposed to be partners in our business in Iran, and here some business in Iran, we ought to be partners in this. Some discussions of negotiations were held as to how that might be arranged, and ended up being arranged by revitalizing a joint venture company that had been earlier formed, called Pars Data Systems, that was owned, essentially 50% by the Mahavive interest, and 50% by the EDS interest. And he at the same time was in the process of establishing a foundation, Mr. Mahavive, an educational foundation which later, books, schools, he donated a large portion of his personal fortune to that. And his ownership of the joint venture with the company was transferred to that. And then EDS, when it signed the contract with the Ministry, subcontracted to the joint venture

JH company, the portion of the contract that called for recruiting and cont. training Iranian citizens to perform services that EDS was doing in the same place. The concept being at the end of the EDS contract there would be a trained staff of Iranian citizens who would then be transferred to the Ministry payroll and they would have a selfcontained data processing capability. New data center, new computers, new systems, new staff. So that was the connection briefly between the two companies. Mr. Mahavive, by being a wealthy and prominent, influential Iranian during the Shah's regime...closely identified with the monarchy, who was a, I believe, a target of Dadgar, because of his...the unpopularity that he would have with the new regime that was beginning to be more and more apparent with the merge of all the turmoil. In particular, I think Dadgar suspected that in the process of Mr. Mahavive coming back into the picture at the time the Ministry contract was being negotiated, that it was very likely, knowing the way things worked in Iran at that time, that he had been involved in some sort of improper conduct to attain the contract. I think he also saw that as a potential leak to expand his investigation from the Ministry where he had been occupying his time into Mr. Mahavive's business in general, to expand it to the monarchy, to be a big hero in the eyes of the merging anti-Shah forces. On the assumption, or making assumption as far as I know, that there must be alot of fire around, the smoke is there, and all he had to do was get in there and start investigating and he would uncover all sorts of nasty things that had been done by or on behalf of the Shah and the Shah's people.

*quid quid*

KF Okay. He gave you a quick pro quo (that's what it sounds like), or at least he said he would?

JH Exactly. He was...basically he was saying if we'd turn states evidence he could cut the charges, grant immunity, what have you. And that's..I guess what we had tried to explain to him, is we didn't know of anything that would help him, but we'd be happy to tell him what we knew. And we proceeded to do so, we tried to...thinking that that was his motivation, we tried to tell him, not tell him untruth, but tell him truth and leaving out portion, in such that it would give him some rabbit trails to go down.

KF On February 10th, when you thought you were almost there, you thought you were there, in fact, you went to Bank Omran. Am I right in thinking it was Farhad Baktiar that you saw who said that the lawyer has requested some language changes?

JH Yes. It was Farhad Baktiar, he was in the process of going out of the country to Switzerland for a few days, which kind of upset us. He again was being very cavalier about...oh, I've got to go out of the country, these gentlemen will take care you, don't worry, if there is any problem at all just call me in Switzerland as if at that time we could just place a phone call, it was more difficult than that. The lawyer was there, he had a few fairly minor changes that he felt were necessary, which was very disappointing to us, because we realized after a two or three day cycle, to communicate back to the United States, to communicate to the United States bank, to get it reflected in the letter of credit, get the letter of credit telecommunicated to the bank in Dobhie, and to get the bank in Dobhie to telephone and confirm to Bank Omran in Tehran that the changes had been made. So it was disappointing that it was done, but that was the situation. While we were discussing it was when the general curfew sounded early that afternoon, I guess is when it was.

KF Okay. And then the following morning you met with Dadgar again, and gave him the Mr. Mahavive report. What time of day would that have been, that meeting?

JH About 11 o'clock in the morning. We had gone to the office that morning to finish the typing of the document, and as soon as the document was typed we, we being ██████████<sup>Abolhasan</sup> and myself, went over to the SSO offices on Eisenhower Avenue I believe, and delivered the document to him. Set there, ██████████<sup>Abolhasan</sup>...it was in English, except the cover letter was in Farsic, and ██████████<sup>Abolhasan</sup> read through the document translating it into Farsic for Dadgar.

KF And in the course of that you received a call from EDS. Do you remember who called?

JH I do not, because Dadgar answered the phone in Farsic, it was probably a secretary placing the call. And indicated it was for us and <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] took the phone, and talked with whoever was on the other end of the phone.

KF In English or in Farsic?

JH In English.

KF Okay. <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] put the phone down and said to you...

JH I'm not sure at this point whether he, I think he had mentioned to me in English what was going on, that he discussed with Dadgar in Farsic the situation that, from the EDS offices that were much nearer to the jail than we were, Dadgar's office...there was a little bit of activity, smoke and another activity around the prison area that we were very concerned about their safety. We again asked him to release them to the custody of the U.S. Embassy, and he said, no, I can't do that, my rule book doesn't say that I can do that. We asked about their..we were concerned about their safety, and he said, oh, don't be very concerned, the worse that could happen is the prison will get overrun, and <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] said, yes, but they might decide to injure Americans if the mob breaks in. And Dadgar said well, Chiapparone will probably be safe, he looks Iranian, and Gaylord, he just kind of shrugged his shoulders.

KF Who told you that Chiapparone and Gaylord were out of jail?

Rashid

JH [REDACTED] I suppose, when he got to the hotel room.

KF And when did you first see them?

JH When they appeared at the door.

KF Okay.

JH They had evidently been down the hall, we had, I believe it was the 11th floor in the hotel, had various rooms up and down the hall, including one corner suite that would have been Ross' room when he was in country, that Bill Gayden had moved into. And since it had a suite, an additional room, in addition to the bedroom, we used that as our bar.....so we were all there, and they had been down the hall, evidently knocking on my door, which was on the other side of the hall, two-thirds or what have you, of the building and <sup>Rashid</sup> [REDACTED] had gone out to get the car and go back down to the prison area, to search for them. So he saw them in the hallway, walked them back down to the room where we were, and opened the door, and there they were, a very joyous occasion. I think that may be the tape...We at that time had an open line through to, I think it was Tom Walter's house, was home that Sunday morning, because we had gotten the cryptic message several hours early, that <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] presumably told about the, where Reza called the hotel, has anybody told you about that?

KF I'm not sure. Tell me.

JH Okay. We had, that morning after the meeting with Dadgar, we'd gone back to our offices in Tehran. And this was Bill Gayden, Bob Young, Keane Taylor, Rich Gallagher, I believe was there. And we went up on top of the buildings, about a three story building, kind of looking around, seeing bonfires going here, there and everywhere, tons of smoke and hear the crackle of gunfire out there. We were just kind of watching all this go on, and then we began to hear a few bullets whisteling by pretty close, saw som people running up our street with automatic weapons. We decided that this was a little too close for comfort, and we would go back to the safety of our hotel. So we got in the cars and got back up to the hotel, with a few road blocks, with the traffic problems. We then spent most of the rest of the afternoon looking out the window, had a picture window, it was on another floor and it was on the northwestern part of Tehran, up on the mountains, we had a pretty good view of the city. We're sitting there counting the

JH bonfires, and whatever area it was. And there was a big club of cont. smoke xxxxxx we thought was the prison area. And we had a phone line through to Dallas, trying to describe the situation. We spent part of the afternoon, as a matter of fact, looking for escape routes from the hotel. Everything seemed to be happening that day. And I guess it was Bob Young and myself that primarily went down the stairway and went out the back entrances to the hotel, and kind of scouted out assuming that some revolutionary mob came in the front door, we went out the back door and there were some thing in the back that we had piled up that we assumed fairly suitable for hiding in. I believe it was during that phone conversation, it may have been a little bit earlier that it turned out that Ross generally, he'd been in the hotel, without alot of...lack of other activities to do had scouted out the place pretty well. And he gave us, by telephone, some suggestions. Said I got to stairwell, so and so, and so and so, for escape route from the hotel. So we were kind of spending the afternoon doing that, and Keane Taylor had gone into the bedroom, and was kind of taking a nap, and the phone rang. And I'm not sure if Keane answered it or somebody answered in the other room, and said, it's for you Keane, but he was half asleep, and as best he could account the conversation to us later, said an Iranian, kind of out of that voice, said are they there yet, and he said, who, what, they said, Paul and Bill are they there yet. He said, no, they are not here. Said well, I can't talk to you now, and Keane wasn't sure what he said, said, I'll call you back, or I'll see you in a little bit, or what. But that conversation, together with the boom of smoke that we could see from the prison area, gave us alot more question and answer ability. And we didn't quite know what was going on, and we were talking to Dallas and trying to figure out what we might be able to do.

KF Did it turn out that that had been <sup>Rashid</sup> [REDACTED]?

JH It turned out that had been <sup>Rashid</sup> [REDACTED]. <sup>Rashid</sup> [REDACTED] then, I'm not sure, maybe a half an hour later, appeared at our hotel room fairly breathless, complete with magazines full of bullets, he abandoned his rifle somewhere, but he had...

KF They made him check his rifle actually, at the door to the hotel.

JH Is that right, he had brought his ammunition in. And he is, he was an excitable type, and he speaks pretty good English, but appeared....so we had a little bit of trouble calming him down. You know, slowing him down so we could understand him. And he explained to us that the prison had been overrun, that he had looked for Paul and Bill, had not found them, had gone to the EDS offices, and had called, and that was the phone call. He had obtained, or received, and that he had come out, didn't want to talk on the phone, because of our belief that they would have to come out to the hotel, he wanted us to explain to him exactly where their cells were, and that he wanted to borrow a car and he was going to go back and look for them. So we drew a little map of where their cell block and where their cells were in the cell block, and gave him the car keys, wished him luck. So we were on the phone with Dallas explaining to them what was going on, and he headed out the door in the hotel, and then moments later the door opened and there was everybody, he had found Paul and Bill out in the hallway. And there was a very jubilant reaction. As I said, I think that that telephone conversation may have been taped. I don't know if the tape is still available, but I believe they taped at the Dallas end.

KF Okay. Now at this point you were on the phone to Dallas. Somebody called Colonel Simons, do you remember who?

JH You mean from the hotel....

KF Yes.

JH No I do not remember that. I'm not sure...

KF Okay. Whoever called, Simons, Coburn and Poche came over to the hotel. Is that the first time that you saw Simons?

JH It was the first time I met him. I, as I said, before I went over there I had some brief inclination that some things were going on. The primary contact at first was Jay Coburn, he would come to the hotel and visit primarily with Ross. And then Keane Taylor, who was primarily with our group was doing logistical support for them. And just as the days went on it became less and less of a secret, and I became more and more aware of what they were doing, and by the time they made their trial run to Turkey I knew pretty much that they were there, and I didn't know any details about exactly what they were up to, but by that time I knew his name.

KF Okay. How did Simons impress you when you first saw him?

JH I guess the primary impression I had of him, just immediately, was that he was not as physically imposing as I had kind of been led to expect. He had let his hair grow, and had grown a mustache, and beard, and looked like an elderly, old, could pass for an Iranian gentleman.

KF Is his hair white?

JH His hair was white.

KF And his beard and mustache were white?

JH Yes.

KF Okay.

JH I kind of walked up to him, I guess, and introduced myself. Just said, Colonel Simons, I'm John Howell, and he said, glad to meet you and turn on about his business, no conversation.

KF Okay. However, there was a rather jubilant conversation going on over the phone, between that hotel room and Dallas.

JH Yes.

KF People, obviously the news that Paul and Bill were out, there was discussion about..it must have been discussion of how you were going to leave the country. Perhaps not very organized discussion. Colonel Simons name is mentioned over the phone.

JH I would not be surprised.

KF And at some point Simons cut off that phone conversation. Do you remember that happening?

JH No.

Abolhasan

KF Then a couple of other things happened. [REDACTED] came in with his wife...No, wait a minute, before that...

Gholam

JH [REDACTED]...

Gholam

KF [REDACTED] came...somebody came in and said Dadgar knows they are out.

JH I read that in one of the summaries. That's a little bit out of sequence. What happened, besides those of us who were staying there and knew about Paul and Bill, there were three Iranians at that point in time, who stumbled over the situation. [REDACTED] being the first who had been with the mob and brought them to the hotel, or came to the hotel and found them in the hallway. Shortly thereafter [REDACTED]...

Rashid

Gholam

KF Yes.

JH Came to the hotel. He had, again, believing what he said, and I had no reason not to, had heard about the jail break, had gone to the area, had driven around the area, looking for them, had not found them and had come to the hotel to tell us that they were out. And I believe he saw them, and was overjoyed, as we all were, and all that.

Abolhasan

JH He left pretty shortly...Then coincidentally, that evening, [REDACTED]  
 cont. [REDACTED] and his wife and children came to the hotel room to take  
 advantage of an offer, we had a kind of outstanding offer, we had to  
 let Judy, who is his wife, who is an American citizen, talk to her  
 parents in Arizona. One thing that we frequently did during our  
 phone conversations...We had the EDS operator transfer it to other  
 places, and just taking advantage of the phone connection. So we had  
 told [REDACTED] <sup>Abolhasan</sup> that you know, if Judy wanted to some evening, that we  
 talked to Dallas on a regular basis, come over and we'll put her in  
 touch with her parents to insure them that she is okay, and all that.  
 So they came over for that purpose. He gave me credence to what  
 [REDACTED] <sup>Abolhasan</sup> told us, that not having no reason to believe was less than  
 forthright, stumbled onto the situation that Paul and Bill were there.  
 It got to be a little bit confusing situation with...I think Keane had  
 gone out and got some rooms first for Paul and Bill, and later got  
 some rooms for the Colonel and Joe and Jay, all on the 12th floor, one  
 floor up. So people were running back and forth. I remember that  
 Abolhasan's [REDACTED] little boy was hungry, hadn't had supper, so we got a  
 hamburger from room service for their little boy. And the phone  
 conversation would not materialize, so they just hung around for a  
 while, and I think I kind of encouraged, I said, well, maybe in a  
 minute we'll get a break from the official communication back and forth  
 long enough for the EDS operator to get Judy connected and let her  
 talk briefly. But it kind of became apparent that was not going to  
 happen in the near future. And [REDACTED] <sup>Abolhasan</sup> said, well, this is not a good  
 time, we'll try again later. So they left, went to his father's house.  
 And [REDACTED] <sup>Abolhasan's</sup> father is a well know and well respected lawyer  
 philosopher in Iran. Had been one of the defense team that defended  
 Mosodeck, who had briefly taken over the job after the 50's, and part  
 of [REDACTED] <sup>Abolhasan's</sup> entree to Dadgar had been able to establish a relationship  
 and some sort of a rapport with Dadgar was through his father. I  
 think maybe Dadgar had autographed copies of his father's books and  
 things like that. So Dadgar was aware that his father his father's  
 apartment. [REDACTED] did not have a phone, so Dadgar had called [REDACTED]

Abolhasan

Abolhasan's

*Mossadeq*

Mossadeq

Abolhasan

JH father's house to get in touch with [REDACTED], and coincidentally at the cont. time that he was <sup>Abolhasan</sup> calling, [REDACTED] walked in the door, and his father said, oh, he just walked in, here. And so <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] was put on, had just come from the hotel and was put on the phone with Dadgar, who said, did you know the Americans are out of the jail. And <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] supposedly said, no, I don't know they are out, it's news to me. How did it happen? And Dadgar briefly told him the story and said, get hold of the Americans and tell them that if they find Chiapparone and Gaylord they are to turn them in, that I'm now willing to negotiate the bail, it ought to be much more reasonable. And that's what they are to do.

Abolhasan

KF Dadgar told [REDACTED] all this, and made these remarks about the bail. Abolhasan [REDACTED] must have then called the hotel.

JH He called the hotel and talked to me, and said, this thing just happened to me. I just got here and Dadgar was on the line and told me this. I said I would get in touch with you and call him back. What should I tell him? And we had a brief huddle, we being primarily, me and Bill Gayden and Colonel Simons. We decided the line to relay back to <sup>Abolhasan</sup> [REDACTED] for him to relay back to Dadgar was that we were very upset, that we had warned him that very day that this was going to happen, we held him personally responsible for their safety, we were trying to contact them, having no idea what gutter they may be laying in this xxxxx of a city, and that if and when we located them, then we would think about talking with him, but right now we were so upset with him that we didn't want to hear his name. So I conveyed that <sup>Abolhasan</sup> message to [REDACTED], and he said he would undertake the call to Dadgar and give him that message.

KF Okay. And then another thing that happened, which you may not have been there. But in the room they got for Paul and Bill, the phone rang. Were you there when that happened?

JH No, I was not.

KF That seems to have been some kind of a last straw, and the Colonel decided to move Paul and Bill out. You stayed at the hotel.

JH Yes.

KF But the following morning you all went over to the Dvoranchik's house.

JH Yes. Our general instructions from the Colonel when he left that evening were, stay at the hotel, leave the next morning, as if we are going to office xxxxxxxx.

KF Now tell me...You then actually spent two days, there were eleven of you by my count...Two days in a three bedroom apartment.

JH And the dog.

KF Yes. Do you remember the name of the dog.

JH Buffy.

KF You are the first person that remembered.

JH I started to say, no I can't, but it just came to me.

KF Tell me about those two days, eleven people, close quarters, a revolution going on.

JH It was not a long enough period of time that the close quarters got to be a problem. There was no conflict between the people, and everybody was joyous to be together, so we didn't have any kind of personality problems, per se. We got there pretty early on the morning after the jail break. The immediate problem was the Colonel was always trying to think of a way out of the country. We, as you pointed out, had eleven people and a dog, which alot of us thought was apparently optional. Kathy Gallagher didn't necessarily agree, but...

KF Was there any discussion about that?

JH Oh, yes. We never got to the point where, you know, we had to have a show down, but there was some discussions kind of amongst some of the other of us, that damn dog, you know, no way in the world am I going to ride horseback with that dog on my back, or anything like that.

KF Did you know that Colonel Simons told Jay to get rid of it at one point?

JH No, I wasn't aware of that. It wouldn't surprise me, I'd say that. Discussions centered around overland, going overland. The fact that they had two Range Rovers, and that would not be sufficient for eleven of us, it would be very crowded....

END OF SIDE A--TAPE #18