

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Ken Follett
FROM: John Howell
DATE: August 17, 1982
RE: Meetings with Dadgar

My notes indicate that the dates, attendees, and general topics of discussion at meetings between EDS representatives (other than Chiapparone and Gaylord) and Dadgar during January and February, 1979, were as follows:

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1. On January 14, 1979, at approximately 1:30 p.m., John Howell and ██████████ met with Dadgar at the EDS offices in Tehran, with ██████████ serving primarily as a translator. The meeting was a preliminary one, with me primarily trying to explain that EDS in general and Chiapparone and Gaylord in particular had done nothing wrong. Dadgar on the other hand purported to express surprise that the "bail" had not already been paid if EDS was so sure that nothing wrong had been done. We also discussed my meeting with Dr. Kian at the Ministry of Justice that morning. Later during that day, I had other meetings with Dadgar and his staff in attempting to respond to particular questions raised by Dadgar, such as the legal relationship between the various EDS entities, and similar matters.

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2. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on January 17, 1979, John Howell, Keane Taylor, and ██████████ met with Dadgar and various Ministry representatives at Dadgar's office in the SSO building. At this meeting, Dadgar attempted to convince EDS to cooperate in a turnover of the small data center, commonly referred to as the "125 data center." He indicated that if EDS did so cooperate, he would be in a position to ignore new charges and therefore avoid increasing the "bail" even further. He also

indicated that negotiating a business solution to our problems with the Ministry might be a very helpful approach to resolving the detention situation, and that as the negotiations progressed, he might be in a position to drop charges, reduce bail, etc. Finally, he indicated that it would be helpful if the various project managers would talk to him or prepare reports for him as to the status of the particular projects for which they had responsibility, but did not indicate any particular favorable action that might result from such cooperation.

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3. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 22, 1979, after a meeting with Ministry representatives concerning the turnover of the 125 data center, Bob Young, John Howell and ██████████ stopped by Dadgar's office for a brief conversation. Dadgar again advised EDS to pursue the possibility of renegotiating the contract and informed us that the bail would not be lowered under any circumstances except the successful completion of such renegotiation.

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 4. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on January 30, 1979, John Howell and ██████████ met with Dadgar at his office at the SSO building. We delivered some documents to him and discussed the form of bank guarantee that would be acceptable for posting bail. We also discussed some information that we had provided to his auditors in response to their questions. He exhibited some interest in the relationship between EDS and Abolfath Mahvi, and we offered to provide him that information if he desired. He stated that that would be very helpful, and referred us to a provision of Iranian law that would allow him to dismiss charges against people who cooperate with an investigation.

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 5. At approximately 12:00 noon on February 5, 1979, Lou Goelz and Al Jordan of the Embassy staff and ██████████ ██████████ of EDS met with Dadgar at his office in the SSO building. The purpose of the meeting was to explain the terms upon which the U.S. Government would issue its guaranty, in lieu of a bank guaranty, as "bail" for Chiapparone and Gaylord. Dadgar rejected the approach explaining that Iranian law did not allow him to accept a governmental guaranty. When informed that the Embassy had been instructed to proceed to the highest level within the Iranian government on this matter, Dadgar became very angry and stated that it would be very

easy for them to remove him from this case, in which event he would be forever grateful. He stated that this example typifies the problem with the United States Government in that the typical U.S. reaction is to make contact at the highest level without knowing or caring about what is going on with people at lower levels. After Goelz and Jordan left, Dadgar also pressured [REDACTED] about the Mahvi report.

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6. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on February 6, 1979, Bob Young, John Howell and [REDACTED] stopped by Dadgar's office at the SSO building after a meeting with the Board of Directors of SSO. We reported on the meeting with the SSO in which we had tried to initiate renegotiation of the contract and had worked out a procedure for a limited turnover of the 125 data center. He seemed pleased with the progress, indicating that the people at SSO were chicken-hearted and worthless and were worried about not doing anything wrong instead of trying to do something right. He again pressured us for the Mahvi's report and told us that if we had not delivered it by Saturday, February 10, 1978, then he would come to the EDS offices and conduct his own interrogations, in which event we would not get the benefit of having voluntarily cooperated with his investigation.

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7. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on February 11, 1979, John Howell and [REDACTED] met with Dadgar at his office in the SSO building. The primary purpose of our meeting was to deliver the Mahvi report. Dadgar read the cover letter which was in Farsi and, at his request, [REDACTED] read through the entire report translating from the original English to Farsi. During this meeting, we received a call from the EDS office about potential danger in the prison area, and we attempted to convince Dadgar that he should release Chiapparone and Gaylord to the custody of the U.S. Embassy so that he would no longer be responsible for their safety. Dadgar refused and said that the U.S. Embassy could not be considered an Iranian prison and that the worst that could happen would be the crowds breaking open the prison and releasing the prisoners. When reminded that the crowd might decide to kill Americans, Dadgar acknowledged that was a possibility, but stated that Chiapparone would have no trouble passing as an Iranian and Gaylord might not make it anyway.

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