Ken,

If you need more on the Mafia or organized crime please ask me for copies of the following two books:

1/5/1
0836696 LCCN: 77015446 //r852
The rise of the Mafia in New York ; from 1896 through World War II / by Giuseppe Selvaggi ; translated (from La mia tomba e New York) and edited by William A. Packer
UNIFORM TITLE: Mia tomba e New York
Selvaggi, Giuseppe, 1923-
Packer, William A

Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 182 p., [4] leaves of plates : ill. ; 24 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1978
PLACE OF PUBLICATION: Indiana
ISBN: 0672521776
LC CALL NO.: HV6452.N7 S4413 DEWEY CALL NO.: 364.1/06
RECORD STATUS: Corrected or revised record
BIBLIOGRAPHIC LEVEL: Monograph
LANGUAGE: English
MULTIPLE LANGUAGES PRESENT: English; Italian SUMMARY LANGUAGE(S): English; Italian
ILLUSTRATIONS: Illustrations; Plates
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION: New York
NOTES:
Includes index.
DESCRIPTORS:
Mafia -- New York (State); Organized crime -- New York (State) -- History **---NOTE: the emphasis here is on New York State, not exclusively the city.**

4/5/1
1753245 LCCN: 83004773 //r85
East side, west side ; organizing crime in New York, 1930-1950 / Alan Block
Block, Alan A

New Brunswick, U.S.A. : Transaction Books, xxii, 265 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1980 REISSUE DATE: 1983
PLACE OF PUBLICATION: New Jersey
ISBN: 0878559310 (pbk.)
LC CALL NO.: HV6795.N5 B57 1983 DEWEY CALL NO.: 364.1/06/07471 RECORD STATUS: Corrected or revised record
BIBLIOGRAPHIC LEVEL: Monograph
LANGUAGE: English
ILLUSTRATIONS: Illustrations
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION: New York
NOTES:
Reprint. Originally published: Cardiff : University

College Cardiff Press, 1980. Includes bibliographical references and index. DESCRIPTORS:
Crime and criminals -- New York (N.Y.) -- History; Organized crime -- New York (N.Y.) -- History
New York (N.Y.) -- Social conditions

The following book is one of <u>very</u> few items about organized crime in Massachusetts. I suspect it covers events much more recent than the 1930's (but I've not seen the book to confirm this).

6/5/2
2727933 LCCN: 88030825
The underboss ; the rise and fall of a Mafia family / Gerard O'Neill & Dick Lehr
O'Neill, Gerard
Lehr, Dick

1st ed. New York : St. Martin's Press, 281 p. [8] p. of plates : ill. ; 22 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1989
PLACE OF PUBLICATION: New York
ISBN: 0312026196
LC CALL NO.: HV6452.M42 M346 1989 DEWEY CALL NO.: 364.1/06/074461 RECORD STATUS: Increase in encoding level from prepublication record BIBLIOGRAPHIC LEVEL: Monograph RECORD ENCODING LEVEL: Full level LANGUAGE: English
ILLUSTRATIONS: Illustrations; Plates
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION: Massachusetts
NOTES:
"A Thomas Dunne book."
NAMED PERSON: Angiulo family
DESCRIPTORS:
Angiulo family
Mafia -- Massachusetts -- Boston -- Case studies; Criminal investigation -- Massachusetts -- Boston -- Case studies

Nelson-Hall Series in Justice Administration
Consulting editor: **Jon R. Waltz**
Northwestern University School of Law

See esp. p. 95-127

About the Author

Howard Abadinsky is Associate Director of the Criminal Justice Program at Saint Xavier College/Chicago, and an Inspector for the Cook County Sheriff; he was a parole officer in New York for 15 years. The author of several books on organized crime, Abadinsky holds a Ph.D. in sociology from New York University and is the founder of the International Association for the Study of Organized Crime.

Organized Crime Second Edition

Howard Abadinsky


Nelson-Hall
Chicago

1985

chapter 2

Structure of Organized Crime, Model One: Italian-American Crime Families

Funeral of Angelo Genna



Used by permission of the Chicago Historical Society

There are several distinct groups that have been identified as having all or most of the attributes of organized crime:

1. Italian-American crime Families[1]
2. Outlaw motorcycle gangs
3. Black criminal gangs
4. Latin-American crime Families
5. Oriental criminal gangs
6. Independent white criminal gangs

Because of their longevity and importance, Italian-American crime Families have been subjected to greater scrutiny by law-enforcement agencies and researchers than any of the other OC groups. As a result, more is known about them, there is more public awareness of their operations, and the nature of their organization has even become a subject for scholarly debate. One view, offered by the Task Force on Organized Crime (1967), is often referred to as the *corporate/bureaucratic analogy*.


Corporate/Bureaucratic Analogy

The corporation, the military, and the police are examples of bureaucratic organization, the mode of organization normally used for carrying out large-scale tasks. Bureaucratic organizations have complicated hierarchies, a good deal of specialization, and extensive divisions of labor. Positions are supposed to be filled on the basis of skill, and responsibilities are carried out in an impersonal manner. There is an elaborate set of rules and regulations, and communication from the top of the hierarchy to the persons on the bottom is usually in written (e.g., memo) form.

According to Cressey, writing as a consultant for the Task Force on Organized Crime (1967: 7-8), the basic unit of Italian-American organized crime is the *monopolistic corporation* called the *family*, consisting only of men. It is diagrammed in figure 2.1.

> Each family is headed by one man, the "boss," whose primary functions are maintaining order and maximizing profits. Subject only to the possibility of being overruled by the national advisory group, which will be discussed below, his authority in all matters relating to his family is absolute.
>
> Beneath each boss is an "underboss," the vice-president or deputy director of the family. He collects information for the boss; he relays messages to him; and passes his instructions down to his own underlings. In the absence of the boss, the underboss acts for him.
>
> On the same level as the underboss, but operating in a staff capacity, is the

Figure 2.1
An Organized Crime Family



SOURCE: Task Force on Organized Crime, 1967, p. 9

consigliere, who is a counselor or adviser. Often an elder member of the family who has partially retired from a career in crime, he gives advice to family members, including the boss and underboss, and thereby enjoys considerable influence and power.

Below the level of the underboss are the *caporegime*,[2] some of whom serve as buffers between the top members of the family and the lower-echelon personnel. To maintain their insulation from the police, the leaders of the hierarchy (particularly the boss) avoid direct communication with the workers. All commands, information, complaints, and money flow back and forth through a trusted go-between. A *caporegima* fulfilling this buffer capacity, however, unlike the underboss, does not make decisions or assume any of the authority of his boss.

Other *caporegime* serve as chiefs of operating units. The number of men supervised in each unit varies with the size and activities of particular families. Often the *caporegima* has one or two associates who work closely with him, carrying orders, information, and money to the men who belong to his unit. From a business standpoint, the *caporegima* is analogous to plant supervisor or sales manager.

The lowest-level "members" of a family are the *soldati*, the soldiers or "button" men who report to the *caporegime*. A soldier may operate a particular illicit enterprise—e.g., a loan-sharking operation, a dice game, a lottery, a bookmaking operation, a smuggling operation—on a commission basis, or he may "own" the enterprise and pay a portion of its profit to the organization, in return for the right to operate. Partnerships are common between two or more soldiers and between soldiers and men higher up in the hierarchy. Some soldiers and most upper-echelon family members have interests in more than one business.

Beneath the soldiers in the hierarchy are large numbers of employees and commission agents who are not members of the family and are not necessarily of Italian descent. These are the people who do most of the actual work in the various enterprises. They have no buffers or other insulation from law enforcement. . . .

. . .The highest ruling body of the 24 families is the "commission." This body serves as a combination legislature, supreme court, board of directors, and arbitration board; its principal functions are judicial. Family members look to the commission as the ultimate authority on organizational and jurisdictional disputes. It is composed of the Nation's most powerful families but has authority over all 24. [For a map of the families, see figure 2.2.]

Ralph Salerno, a former police officer with the New York City Police Department's Central Intelligence Bureau and, like Cressey, a consultant to the Task Force on Organized Crime, emphasizes the corporate analogy (Salerno and Tompkins 1969: 84-85):

> The major difference between the diagram of an organized crime family and the chart of a major corporation is that the head of the enterprise—the Boss—does not have a box over him labeled "stockholder." Many of the other boxes are paralleled in the underworld. The Underboss serves a function similar to that of executive vice-president. The Counselor [*consigliere*] off to one side is much like a vice-chairman of the board or a special assistant. He is an advisor but has no command authority. . . .

Figure 2.2
Cities with Italian-American Crime Families



KEY

⊙ "FAMILY" BOSS ALSO MEMBER OF "COMMISSION"
• OTHER "FAMILIES"

Cressey notes that "not everyone who wants to participate in the business conducted by crime syndicates can do so. One cannot 'just decide' to become a member of Cosa Nostra,[2] . . . any more than he can 'just decide' to become a professional baseball player. . . . His desires must be matched by his competence, and by the desires of those who control membership. . . ." (1969: 242). Cressey points out that the incarceration or death of a member of any crime family does little to affect the family's activities, because for each membership position there are at least a hundred applicants.[3]

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

> The lieutenants or captains [*capiregime*] farther below are the equivalent of divisional vice-presidents or general managers. There are different staff jobs corresponding to personnel director, public relations manager, general counsel, security officer, and the like, but they are not assigned permanently to any one man. . . .

Cressey notes that "not everyone who wants to participate in the business conducted by crime syndicates can do so. One cannot 'just decide' to become a member of Cosa Nostra,[3]. . .any more than he can 'just decide' to become a professional baseball player. . . . His desires must be matched by his competence, and by the desires of those who control membership. . . ." (1969: 242). Cressey points out that the incarceration or death of a member of any crime family does little to affect the family's activities, because for each membership position there are at least a hundred applicants.

Every bureaucratic organization has an elaborate set of rules and regulations that govern the behavior of its members. Cressey (1967: 40) admits, however, that "we have been unable to locate even a summary of the code of conduct which is used in governing the lives of American crime families .' " This deficiency is corrected by assuming commonality between the code of prison inmates and that of organized crime (1967: 41):

> The snippets of information we have been able to obtain have convinced us that there is a striking similarity between the code of conduct and the enforcement machinery used in the confederation of organized criminals and the code of conduct and enforcement machinery which governs the behavior of prisoners. This is no coincidence for . . . both the prisoner government and the confederation governments are responses to strong official governments which are limited in their means for achieving their control objectives. In order to maintain their status as governors of illegal organizations, the leaders of the two types of organization must promulgate and enforce similar behavior codes.

Based on this analogy, Cressey suggests five rules of conduct (1969: 175-76):

1. Be loyal to members of the organization. Do not interfere with each other's interests. Do not be an informer.
2. Be rational. Be a member of the team. Do not engage in battle if you cannot win.
3. Be a man of honor. Always do right. Respect womanhood and your elders. Do not rock the boat.
4. Be a stand-up guy. Keep your eyes and ears open and your mouth shut. Do not sell out.
5. Have class. Be independent. Know your way around in the world.

Before turning to an alternate view of the structure of OC, we should note the important ramifications of the corporate/bureaucratic analogy. Francis

Ianni (1972: 11●) states that its use "may arise from honest attempts to explain syndicate organization in terms that are familiar to the public." But Ianni is suspicious. A widespread belief in the existence of an evil corporation/bureaucracy, with a set of goals aimed at corrupting and subverting the American way of life, can enhance the efforts of law-enforcement agencies to increase their budgetary allocations. Dwight Smith (1975: 88) argues that "proving" the existence of such an organization can justify the use of certain law-enforcement techniques that otherwise might be severely limited if not curtailed—e.g., wiretapping and eavesdropping. Richard Quinney (1974: 104), writing from a Marxist perspective, argues that the "war" against organized crime "further extends the power of the government over the lives of citizens, overturning even constitutional protections."

Kinship and Patron-Client Networks

In contrast to the corporate/bureaucratic analogy, Ianni (1972) argues that organized crime, or at least the Italian-American version, is a traditional social system organized by action and by cultural values that have nothing to do with modern bureaucratic or corporate principles. He maintains that Italian-American crime syndicates are better explained through an examination of kinship networks; the subtitle of Ianni's (1972) book *A Family Business* is *Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*.

Gay Talese (1971), in a study of the crime Family of Joseph Bonanno, points out some of the family ties (in the literal, blood sense) of leading crime figures in the United States. The son of Joseph Bonanno, Salvatore ("Bill"), is married to Rosalie Profaci, the niece of crime boss Joseph Profaci; Buffalo crime boss Stefano Magaddino is Joseph Bonanno's cousin; two of Joseph Profaci's daughters married into the Joseph Zerilli and William Tocco crime Families of Detroit; the daughter of crime Family boss Carlo Gambino is married to the son of crime Family boss Thomas Lucchese. Ovid Demaris (1981) notes that Nick Licata, boss of the Los Angeles crime Family, is married to Josephine Tocco of the Detroit Tocco Family. Paul Meskil (1973) notes that Carlo Gambino was the godfather of one of crime boss Joseph Colombo's daughters, Catherine, and he points out that many members of the Gambino crime Family are related to the Family patriarch. Carlo Gambino's brothers Paul and Joseph are *capiregime*, as are several Castellanos, relatives on his mother's side. Many other relatives, including some recent immigrants from Sicily, are *soldati* in the Gambino Family. Nicholas Gage (1976) reports that about 150 of the estimated 500 members of the Gambino crime Family are blood relatives.

Instead of bureaucratic, Italian American OC is patrimonial (Collins 1975: 65fn):

> Patrimonial organization, most characteristic of traditional societies, centers around families, patrons and their clients, and other personalistic networks. The emphasis is on traditional rituals that demonstrate the emotional bonds among men; the world is divided into those whom one can trust because of strongly legitimated personal connections, and the rest of the world from whom nothing is to be expected that cannot be exacted by cold-blooded bargaining or force. In modern bureaucratic organization, by contrast, personal ties are weaker, less ritualized, and emotionally demonstrative; in their place is the allegiance to a set of abstract rules and positions. The different class cultures in patrimonial and bureaucratic organizations are accordingly affected. Patrimonial elites are more ceremonious and personalistic. Bureaucratic elites emphasize a colder set of ideals.

Indeed, the bureaucratic model is impractical for organized crime in which there must be constant concern with the very real possibility that communications are being monitored. The use of the telephone must be limited (often used only to arrange for in-person meetings). Written communication is avoided. Information, orders, money, and other goods are transferred on an intimate, face-to-face basis. Lengthy chains of command, characteristic of modern bureaucracy, are impractical for organized crime, and this limits the span of control.

Randall Collins (1975: 293) points out that control is a special problem for patrimonial organizations. Bureaucracies develop, he argues, to overcome such problems: "Patrimonial organizations cannot be very well controlled much beyond the sight of a master." He notes that, when the geographic range becomes too great, the organization collapses into feudalism—which is exactly how Italian-American OC appears to this writer. While such decentralization limits the efficiency of the organization, it also presents significant problems for law-enforcement agencies. Joseph Albini (1971: 285) points out that the rigid and bureaucratic system alleged by Cressey and law-enforcement officials would be an easy target to move against: "All that would be necessary to destroy it would be to remove its top echelon." Instead, he argues, the syndicate's real power lies in its amorphous quality: "If a powerful syndicate figure is incarcerated, all that has really been severed is his position as a patron to his clients." If it so happens that another individual is in a position to assume this role, the clients may continue in this enterprise. The alternative is to find a new patron, *caporegime*, boss, or crime Family, or to develop their own enterprises accordingly. Let us look at the patron-client networks in organized crime.

Jeremy Boissevain (1974: 24) points out that every person is embedded in a social network, "the chains of persons with whom a given person is in contact." Since contact can be through a chain of persons, an individual can send "messages" to far more people than he or she actually knows on a direct basis. These are the "friends of friends," a phrase that refers to *mafioso* in Sicily. Boissevain (1974: 147) notes: "Every individual provides a point at which networks interact. But not everyone displays the same interest in and talent for cultivating relationships with strategic persons for profit." To be

successful, a member of organized crime, from the boss down to a soldier, must display such interest and talent. This is done by acting as a patron.

Eric Wolf (1966: 16-17) states that, when the social exchange relationship (see Homans 1961; Blau 1964) becomes unbalanced, we have a patron-client relationship: the patron "provides economic aid and protection against both the legal and illegal exactions of authority. The client in turn pays back in more intangible assets," e.g., esteem and loyalty. He may also offer political or other important support, thus making the relationship reciprocal. The patron may act as a power broker between the client and the wider society, both legitimate and illegitimate.

The member of an Italian-American organized crime Family, acting as a patron, has certain resources as well as strategic contacts with people who control other resources directly or who have access to such persons. The member-as-patron can "put you in touch with the right people." He can bridge communication gaps between the police and criminals, between business operators and syndicate-connected union leaders; he can transcend the world of business and the world of the illegitimate entrepreneur. He is able to perform important favors and be rewarded in return with money or power. Boissevain and Henner Hess (1973) refer to this network surrounding patrons as *partito:* a circle of dyadic relationships orbiting the crime Family member in which most clients have no relations with each other except through the patron.

Boissevain (1974) notes that a patron needs a great deal of time to manage such a network adequately, to develop and maintain contacts, provide services that enhance power and income, and keep well informed. Since organized-crime members do not usually have to maintain conventional schedules, they are free to "hang around," to pick up and disseminate important information. An OC patron may dominate a particular geographic area or industry. He will have available a network of informants and connections, e.g., with police and other officials, as well as specialized criminal operatives such as *papermen* (persons who convert stolen "paper," e.g., stocks, bonds, into cash), *torches* (professional arsonists), *muscle-men* or *legbreakers*, and *enforcers*. He is in a position to fence large amounts of stolen goods or to lend out various amounts of money at usurious interest—*loansharking*. He will act as a center for information, "license" criminal activities, and use his position to assist criminals in linking up for specialized operations, e.g., hijacking, bank robbery. He can provide stolen guns and cars and other items necessary for criminal activity. Criminal activities in *his* territory, or that of his Family, not under the patronage of a Family member, are "outlaw" operations, and the participants act without his "grace." If they are arrested he will not intervene; if their activities conflict with those under his patronage, police raids or violence will result. Independent criminal operatives may be forced to pay tribute for his "protection"—protection from violence that he can inflict or cause to be inflicted. Professional criminals who are not necessarily part of organized crime will often pay financial tribute to the patron, indicating

rispetto, a word that literally means respect, but that inclines toward protection. This show of *rispetto* enables the criminals to secure vital information and other assistance and ensures that other criminals will not jeopardize their operations.

Vincent Siciliano (1970: 55) provides an example. He and his gang held up a card game that was under patronage of the Genovese crime Family in New York—a "connected" game. He was "summoned."

> When we got to the cafe and those big shots started laying down the law and telling us we knocked over one of their games, butter wouldn't melt in my mouth. I told them I was careful to ask if the game has any connections, and the other guys agreed and we all agreed that nobody had any idea in the whole world that the game had any connections.
>
> The way we always put it (the way you still put it) is that we didn't know they were "good people," which is like saying the guy is an American or an official something. Part of some organization. Not an outlaw.
>
> First they made us give back the money. . . .

Siciliano escaped more serious consequences because his deceased father had been in organized crime.


We can now offer an alternative to the diagram of an OC Family presented by Cressey and the Task Force on Organized Crime (see fig. 2.3). Instead of a corporation, the structure of OC can be conceived of in terms of astronomy: at the center of this "universe" (crime Family) is the sun (*capo*, or boss, and his *sottocapo*, underboss, and *consigliere*, advisor) surrounded by orbiting planets *(capiregime);* each planet is surrounded by orbiting moons *(soldati)*. They constitute a crime Family and are tied together in a network that includes nonmember associates who are clients of each member. Each universe (boss) is connected (by kinship, friendship, and mutual respect) to every other universe (boss). In toto, this is Italian-American organized crime.

Membership

The concept of "membership" provides an important key to understanding Italian-American organized crime and its peculiar ability to survive as a dominant force for six decades.

Ianni (1974) points out that childhood gangs in the ghetto are sources of organized-crime membership. Salvatore Giangana, more widely known as Sam ("Momo") Gianeana,[4] Chicago OC boss, began his criminal career as a leader of the "42 Gang" in the Italian ghetto of Chicago known as "The Patch." Salerno (1969) reports that recruiting into organized crime involves the careful study of neighborhood youngsters by those who control membership. A potential recruit must exhibit a recognition for the authority of the organization and a willingness to perform various criminal functions (usually minor at first) with skill and daring. Robert Woetzel (1963: 3) points out that

Figure 2.3
Patron-Client Network of Italian-American Organized Crime



(a) At the center of each organized crime unit (*famiglia*; Family) is the boss (*capo*). He is assisted by an underboss (*sottocapo*) and a counselor (*consigliere*).
(b) Surrounding the boss are his clients, the captains (*capiregime*).
(c) Orbiting around each captain are his clients, the lowest-ranking members who have been formally initiated into the Family (*soldati*; "made-guys").
(d) The members act as patrons to nonmember clients.
(e) Each unit is tied to other Families throughout the country by the *capo*, whose sovereignty is recognized by the other bosses.

"the standards of the teenage gang from which the potential criminals come are the same as those of an adult conspiracy": a code of loyalty and exclusive "turf" (territory). The gang boy may also have a criminal record and antisocial attitude, which indicate that he is a "stand-up" kid, the proper credentials for a career in OC.

Raymond Martin, a former ranking officer with the New York Police Department, describes why recruitment is made easy in certain neighborhoods (1963: 61):

> On so many street corners in Bath Beach [an Italian neighborhood in Brooklyn]; in so many luncheonettes and candy stores in Bensenhurst [an Italian neighborhood in Brooklyn], boys see the mob-affiliated bookies operate. They meet the young toughs, the mob enforcers. They hear the tales of glory recounted—who robbed what, who worked over whom, which showgirl shared which gangster's bed, who got hit by whom, the techniques of the rackets and how easy it all is, how the money rolls in. What wonder is it that some boys look forward to being initiated in these practices with the eagerness of a college freshman hoping to be pledged by the smoothest fraternity on campus. With a little luck and guts, they feel, even they may someday belong to that splendid, high-living band, the mob.

To be eligible for membership, a young man must be of Italian descent. (It is not certain how many of one's grandparents must be of Italian blood to qualify.) He needs a sponsor and must have a long history of successful criminal activity or possess certain skills required by the Family. Jimmy ("The Weasel") Fratianno, for example, of the Los Angeles crime Family, possessed an important "skill": the ability to execute persons in a dispassionate manner (Demaris 1981). Every potential member, however, is expected to participate in a murder—although not necessarily as the actual executioner. Such participation more closely binds the person to the ongoing conspiracy that is OC and prevents government agents from becoming members. (There are indications that certain members have avoided this requirement.) An OC Family also is interested in criminals who have proven to be money-makers, "earners" who can increase the Family income.

It needs to be stressed, however, that each member is an independent operator, not an employee—he receives no salary from the Family. The *made-guy* (OC term for member; also referred to as a *good fellow* or *amico nostro*—"a friend of ours") has a form of "franchise" from the Family to make money by using Family connections, bolstered by the status (that is, fear) that membership generates. Thus, the member is an independent entrepreneur, violent and aggressive, who is constantly on the prowl for opportunities for making money. In a typical pattern, a "made-guy," a franchised member of a crime Family, will attract nonmembers who are eager to associate with him, to become "connected," since an associate shares some of the status and connections that the Family enjoys. The member-as-patron thus sits at the center of a network of nonmember clients, which can constitute an action-based unit for coordinated criminal activities. If the member is able to generate consid-

erable income, he gains greater status in the Family and can become a candidate for advancement to *caporegime*. If successful associates are Italian, they become candidates for membership.

Each member, the *soldato,* is expected to share a portion of his earnings with his *caporegime;* the *caporegime* is expected to share his earnings with the underboss and boss. What the boss earns is *his:* money in an OC Family goes only in one direction—up.

Because of their acquisitive and violent nature, members of OC can easily come into conflict with other members in the same, or another, Family. The more members a Family has, the greater the likelihood of conflict: too many "made-guys" in search of too few money-making opportunities. Under such circumstances, members are more likely to become involved in high-risk ventures that can be a threat to the safety of other Family members and the Family hierarchy. This dynamic serves to place limitations on membership. Each new member is also a potential security threat to the Family, a potential informant, so new members are selected with great caution, and a prospective member may have to serve the Family for many years in order to gain membership status.

Cressey (1969) states that the "membership books" were closed in 1931, and since then new members have been initiated on a very limited basis and with the approval of the commission of Family bosses. According to Cressey, this was an effort by the most powerful bosses, heads of the largest Families, to maintain the status quo. The FBI estimates that there are about 2,000 "made" members in the United States, with the largest Families being the Gambino and Genovese Families of New York City. There are, of course, thousands of Italian and non-Italian nonmember associates.

Membership, as opposed to some type of associate status, provides the rewards associated with being an "insider." As one member told this writer, "A made-guy is considered more honorable," meaning there is a greater level of trust. Only members will be allowed to attend certain important meetings and to be privy to important conversations and information. The basic mechanism for resolving disputes in OC is arbitration—a *sitdown* or *table*—and a nonmember needs a member to represent him. A nonmember associate in dispute with a "made-guy" is at a distinct disadvantage—a disadvantage that can be life threatening.

There is also considerable "psychic gain" associated with being a made-guy. Within criminal and certain legitimate circles, membership conveys a great deal of prestige, if not fear. There are a number of otherwise legitimate persons who are attracted by the mystique that surrounds OC. Popular sources report that many young women are attracted to OC figures and the bars and nightclubs that are owned or frequented by "wise-guys" (another term connoting a member of OC).

There are also important disadvantages associated with being a member. Law-enforcement agencies take a greater interest in a criminal if it is discovered he is a "made-guy." Any assault on his person requires that the

member kill the offender. He is also required to obey the orders of his boss, even if this requires participation in the murder of a complete stranger, a close friend, or perhaps a relative. But of course, the member is protected by his patron—the boss—who will respond to any attack on one of his members as a personal affront, a fundamental lack of *rispetto*, requiring mobilization of the Family's resources for violence. It is the availability of private violence that makes the OC Family a viable entity.

The Boss

The head of an OC Family is often a senior citizen—he will have needed many years to gain the respect of Family members and to gain the knowledge and connections needed by the Family. Typically, the boss (or *capo*) operates out of a fixed location: a restaurant, private club, or his own business office. Raymond Patriarca, the New England crime boss who died of natural causes in 1984 at age seventy-six, operated out of an office in his vending-machine business, National Cigarette Service, in the "Little Italy" of Providence, Rhode Island. Vincent Teresa (1973: 95) states that the entire area around Patriarca's headquarters was an armed camp: "It was impossible to move through the area without being spotted and reported." The head of the Genovese Family operated out of an Italian restaurant in lower Manhattan to which he was driven every day from his home in Long Island by a chauffeur-bodyguard. In the back of the restaurant was a table reserved for him. Persons having business with the boss would come in all day long and sit at the table for varying periods of time. But strangers were not welcome in the restaurant, which was located in the heart of an Italian neighborhood dominated by the Genovese Family. There was no place to park; all parking spaces were taken by members of the Family or their associates. Anyone walking in the area who was not recognized would be reported to Family members at the restaurant. If a stranger entered the restaurant, he or she was told that a reservation was needed (Abadinsky 1983).

A boss has a number of men who report directly to him. They carry messages and perform assignments as necessary. They also serve to physically protect the boss. Most of the activities of Family members, however, are not under the direction or supervision of the boss, who only finds out about many of the activities of his Family members as the result of periodic briefings by the *caporegime*. Family boss Carlo Gambino would conduct such briefing sessions in a moving car to reduce the possibility of surveillance. Very important or sensitive operations—e.g., those that could result in conflict with other Families or gain undue law-enforcement attention—are cleared with the boss in advance. The boss, like many other members of the Family, has investments in illegitimate and legitimate enterprises. These may be in partnership with *amici* (members) from his own or other Families, or with nonmember associates.

In the patrimonial organization that is OC, the *capo* demands absolute respect and requires total obedience. His working day is spent in exchanges with numerous persons. With a word or two, a sentence, a shake of the head or a smile, with a gesture, he can set in motion a host of activities and operations involving dozens, if not hundreds, of persons. The boss is treated with a great deal of deference. People rise when he enters the room. They never interrupt when he is speaking. If they are close, a kiss on the boss's cheek is considered an appropriate gesture of respect. If the boss rises, all rise. If the boss rises and embraces an individual, this is considered a great honor, often reserved only for other Family bosses. The marriage of a son or daughter is a major social event usually attended by other Family bosses (who are often relatives of the bride or groom) and hundreds of lesser crime figures. Decades earlier, it would also have been attended by numerous important public officials and show-business personalities.

The Rules of Organized Crime

As was noted earlier, an elaborate system of written rules and regulations is one of the characteristics of a bureaucracy. While Italian-American crime Families do not have *written* rules, they do have an elaborate set of norms that govern behavior. Ianni (1972) argues that the rules of OC are actually standards of conduct based on the traditions of southern Italy, particularly the concept of family loyalty. However, my research (Abadinsky 1981; 1983) indicates that the rules are not traditional but quite rational and sometimes run counter to southern Italian tradition.

As a result of my research into the Gambino crime Family (1981: 128-29), I found the following rules in operation:

1. Always show *rispetto* to those who can command it.
2. Report any failure to show *rispetto* to one's patron immediately.
3. Violence must be used, even if only of a limited type, to ensure *rispetto*.
4. Never ask for surnames.
5. Never resort to violence in a dispute with a member of another Family.
6. Do not use the telephone except to arrange for a meeting place, preferably in code, from which you will then travel to a safe place to discuss business.
7. Avoid mentioning specifics when discussing business—for example, names, dates, and places—beyond those absolutely necessary for understanding.
8. Keep your mouth shut—anything you hear, anything you see, stays with you, in your head; do not talk about it.
9. Do not ask unnecessary questions; the amount of information given to you is all you need to know to carry out instructions.
10. If your patron arranges for two parties to work together, he assumes responsibility for arbitrating any disputes between the parties.

chapter 8

Organized Crime in New York

New York City corruption depicted by Thomas Nast



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In 1790, a group of white men decked out in feathers and bucks' tails sat cross-legged in wigwams pitched along the Hudson River. They were there at the request of President George Washington to "smoke the peace pipe" with a delegation of Creek Indians. The white men were members of the Society of Saint Tammany; the Creek Indians had been attacking American settlements in Georgia and Florida. For several days the Creek delegation was treated to banquets, concerts, theater, and the wonders of Tammany's New York. The result was a peace treaty that was transmitted to President Washington. Beginning as a fraternal and patriotic society in 1789, Tammany soon emerged as a full-fledged political organization whose leader, Martin Van Buren, was elected the eighth president of the United States in 1836 (Connable and Silberfarb 1967). It became synonymous with the Democratic Party of New York City.

Tammany established a system of district leaders and precinct captains in each Assembly district and by 1838 had a reputation for dispensing favors and social services from funds extorted from vice operators and 6 percent kickbacks from all city employees. The tie-in between criminals and politicians was now firmly established.

During the late 1840s and early 1850s, large numbers of immigrants fled the famine in Ireland for New York. Despite nativist and anti-Catholic sentiment in the Tammany society, the Irish rose quickly to leadership positions there. By the turn of the century, the Irish clearly dominated "The Hall." (The Irish immigrant spoke English and was at home in a saloon, and his willingness to engage in fisticuffs made him a "natural" for the politics of that period.)

From the mid-1800s until World War I, old-style gangs were an important feature of the Tammany-criminal tie-in. By the 1920s, when they were disappearing, the *New York Times* (September 9, 1923) could wax nostalgic about the "old breed" of gang with its twisted sense of valor, as compared with the current (1923) gang style with "the calculation and efficiency of an industrial tool for breaking strikes or wrecking factories" ("New Gang Methods Replace Those of Eastman's Days," Section 9: 3). The *Times* was referring to the demise of the Shirt Tails, Dead Rabbits, Plug Uglies, Bowery Boys, Hudson Dusters, Cherry Hill Gang, Gophers, Five Pointers, and Whyos. The last gang used printed price lists for mayhem commissions, e.g., punching, $2, leg or arm broken, $19, murder, $100 and up (Asbury 1928). Before he left for Chicago, Al Capone was a member of the Five Points Gang, as was Lucky Luciano. These gangs were used by the politicians as "repeaters" and "sluggers," a situation that led the notorious, apelike gang leader Monk Eastman (born Edward Osterman) to utter: "Say, I cut some ice in this town. Why, I make half the big politicians" ("New Gang Meth-

ods. . ."). Andy Logan notes that gangs such as the Whyos were so useful on election day that the politicians made natural alliances with them (1970: 56): "To keep gang members in funds between elections, the politicians found jobs for them in the off-season months." They worked as lookouts, steerers, and bouncers—resident thugs for the gambling houses and brothels.

In contrast, on November 8, 1909, when the gangs were at their height, the *New York Times* decried their use for "hired mayhem" and murder, and pointed to their election-day "specialties" as particularly sinister (White 1908). Herbert Asbury (1928) noted that early in the twentieth century several gangs operated with protection from Tammany, and they controlled various city neighborhoods.

One of the more infamous was the Five Points Gang which had 1,500 members and was led by Paul Kelly (born Paolo Vaccarelli), an ex-pugilist. Kelly eventually left the mayhem of lower Manhattan for Harlem, where he founded the Harlem Branch of the Paul Kelly Association. He became a labor organizer and, with the help of some of his Five Pointers, a vice-president of the International Longshoremen's Association. One of the highlights of New York gang history is the feud between Kelly and his Italian Five Points Gang and the Jewish gang led by Monk Eastman over a small piece of Manhattan real estate that each claimed as its "turf." When their political patrons insisted that they cease the bloodshed, Kelly and Eastman fought it out in a fracas that lasted two hours and ended in a draw.

Eastman was eventually imprisoned, and after his release he served with distinction in the First World War. During that time his gang faded, but Eastman received a full pardon from Gov. Alfred E. Smith for his outstanding military service. Eastman was shot to death by an old crony after a petty quarrel that followed a Christmas Eve drinking bout. The friend, a federal Prohibition agent, received a three-to-ten-year sentence by claiming self-defense—he thought the unarmed Monk was reaching for a gun (Lee 1963).

During this same period, from the mid-nineteenth century through World War I, gang activity and political activity were well coordinated. In Manhattan, organized criminal activities were presided over by a three-man board: a representative of Tammany Hall, a police member, and Frank Farrell, the bookmaking czar who represented gambling interests. Logan (1970) points out that during the years prior to the First World War, the New York City Police Department was more or less a branch of Tammany; indeed, to secure a job as a policeman, a fee of $250 to Tammany was required, and promotions were handled in the same manner. The police not only tended to be corrupt but were also brutal toward the poor and helpless, as the story of Alexander ("Clubber") Williams highlights. This vicious and corrupt officer, who rose to the high rank of inspector, told his recruits: "Boys, there's more justice in the end of this nightstick than there is in all the courts in the land" (Logan 1970: 106). For $15,000 he effected a transfer to the midtown Manhattan area where lucrative graft was available from gambling establishments and

brothels, and Williams informed a newspaper reporter: "I've had nothin' but chuck steak for a long time, and now I am going to get a little of the tenderloin" (Connable and Goldfarb 1967: 215), as this Manhattan section soon became known. Williams was eventually dismissed from the force by New York City Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt (Logan 1970).

Leo Katcher (1959) points out that at this time, prior to the First World War, gangsters were merely errand boys for the politicians and the gamblers; they were at the bottom of the heap. The gamblers were under the politicians, who were "kings." Gambling in Manhattan was "licensed" by Tammany state senator Timothy Sullivan with the support of Police Chief "Big Bill" Devery. When Devery's post was abolished by the state legislature, Sullivan notified the city Democratic leader, "Boss" Richard Croker of Tammany Hall, that unless Devery was reappointed to head the police, "ten thousand gamblers in the Sullivan-Devery syndicate would make no further campaign contributions to Tammany" (Connable and Silberfarb 1967: 224). Devery was reappointed to head the police department. When a Tammany alderman, Paddy Divver, opposed brothels in his district, Sullivan organized a primary election fight against him. With Tom Foley as his candidate, Sullivan sent in the Kelly and Eastman gangs to beat and intimidate Divver voters; Foley won by a margin of three-to-one (Connable and Silberfarb, 1967).

In addition to the likes of Monk Eastman and Paul Kelly, Sullivan used Charles Becker, a New York City police lieutenant in charge of Special (Vice) Squad No. 1, to "muscle" uncooperative gamblers. Sullivan eventually became insane, was committed, escaped, and died on some railroad tracks in Westchester County, New York, in 1912. In 1911, while Sullivan was ill, Lieutenant Becker moved to take over. This move was thwarted on July 5, 1912, the day Herman ("Beansy") Rosenthal was murdered. Rosenthal was a well-known gambler and an associate of Sullivan. When his gambling establishment was raided by the ambitious Becker, Rosenthal went to the newspapers and implicated Becker as his gambling partner; he claimed the raid was a double-cross. This brazen violation of the "code of silence" resulted in the inevitable—Rosenthal's murder. The four gunmen, Harry ("Gyp the Blood") Horowitz, Louis ("Lefty Louie") Rosenberg, Jacob ("Whitey Lewis") Seidenshner, and Frank ("Dago Frank") Cirofici, were convicted and electrocuted ("Conviction of Becker" 1913). Becker was convicted of ordering the murder and became the only American policeman ever to be put to death by the state. (Logan concludes that Becker was framed.)

Charles Murphy, a former saloon keeper, became Tammany boss in 1902, replacing Richard Croker. He remained in the position until his death twenty-two years later. Murphy changed Tammany operations: open gambling and prostitution were ended; total immunity for gangsters was withdrawn. He also moved to cut down the power of the police who, like Charles Becker, had occasionally challenged the politicians (Katcher 1959). Murphy "concluded that the use of the police as major graft collectors was an antiquated concept"

(Logan 1970: 340). Modern organization was needed—a conduit between the politicians and the gamblers, who would be organized into a dues-paying trade association as were the brothel owners. Organized crime began to evolve; Jewish OC in general and Arnold Rothstein in particular were major agents of change.

Jewish Organized Crime in New York

At the turn of the century, the Irish still comprised the dominant force in Tammany Hall. But in the "outside work"—organizing gamblers and brothels at one remove from "The Hall"—Jews began to gain a niche. They helped not only to rationalize illicit activities but to provide a conduit between local crime personnel and the politicians who were so interested in their activities. Among these Jewish OC operatives, Arnold Rothstein was most important, as organizer and innovator.

Arnold Rothstein

The spectre of Arnold Rothstein looms so large over organized crime in New York that it would not be much of an exaggeration to call him its "Godfather." Jenna Weissman Joselit (1983: 143–44) states:

> Rothstein transformed criminal activity from a haphazard, often spontaneous endeavor into one whose hallmarks—specialized expertise, administrative hierarchy, and organizational procedure—correspond to the classic sociological model of a bureaucracy. Thus, Rothstein's illegal business had a definite administrative structure based on specific skills; competence and not ethnic pedigree determined one's rank and, of course, one's position, in his outfit.
>
> . . . Rothstein's office, . . . in the middle of the midtown business district, employed a staff comparable with that of any large (and legitimate) commercial firm, replete with secretaries, bookkeepers, and legal counsel. . . . A decision to enter some new illegal venture tended to be based not on personal motives of revenge or power but on strictly commercial considerations: the amount of profit to be made and the length of time it would take to make it. Finally, by investing the money he earned through illegal channels into legal enterprises such as real estate and the theater, Rothstein made it difficult to ascertain where the illegal enterprise left off and the legitimate one began.

"A.R.," or "The Brain," as Damon Runyon called him, was born in New York in 1882 and served as the inspiration for Meyer Wolfsheim in F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* and for Nathan Detroit in the musical *Guys and Dolls*. His father, an Orthodox Jew born of immigrant parents, was a respected and successful businessman. Arnold Rothstein was also respected and quite successful, but his "business" comprised gambling, bootlegging, drug smuggling, labor racketeering, etc. (Katcher 1959).

The young Rothstein worked in poolrooms and became a "shark," an expert billiard player.[1] The money he earned was used for usurious loans, and Monk Eastman was employed as a collector. Rothstein would later employ Waxey Gordon (born Irving Wexler), the Diamond brothers, "Legs" and Eddie, and other important hoodlums of the day. Rothstein began running dice games and became a bookmaker and the owner of a gambling house. He was associated with "Big Tim" Sullivan, which afforded him political police protection. He became the "bookmaker's bookmaker" in 1914, handling "layoff" bets from other bookmakers. He contracted a crew of thugs for unions, using a gang led by Jacob ("Little Augie") Orgen, who employed, among other prominent hoodlums, Louis ("Lepke") Buchalter and Jacob ("Gurrah") Shapiro. Eventually, Rothstein went into the bail-bond business, insurance, and real estate (Katcher 1959).

Rothstein also fenced stolen bonds and securities, and when Prohibition arrived he organized the importation of liquor from England and Canada. At the same time, he had diamonds and drugs, heroin and cocaine, smuggled in on his whiskey ships, and Rothstein established an international drug-smuggling network. His buyers overseas shipped the drugs into the United States, where they were distributed to organizations in several states: to Torrio and Capone in Chicago; Harry Stromberg ("Nig Rosen") in Philadelphia; Charles ("King") Solomon in Boston; and to Luciano and Buchalter in New York.

His power was enormous, as this pre-Prohibition incident illustrates. Rothstein, who had never been convicted of a crime, was overseeing one of his floating dice game operations when a police raid was announced. Incredulous that in 1919 the police would raid one of *his* games, and fearing a ruse by robbers, Rothstein opened fire, wounding several policemen. The actual evidence against Rothstein was not very strong, but the case was pursued by Inspector Dominick Henry, an honest police officer working for anti-Tammany Mayor John F. Hylan. The grand jury reviewed the evidence but failed to indict Rothstein—they indicted Inspector Henry instead for perjury. Needless to say, (even honest) policemen became rather reluctant to tangle with A. R. (Katcher 1959).

Rothstein continued to play the role of a broker or "middleman," not only between the politicians and the gamblers but between two of New York's political-crime factions. One faction was headed by James J. Hines, a Tammany renegade with ties to Ownie ("Killer") Madden, Dutch Schultz, Bill Dwyer, Vannie Higgens and Larry Fay—important non-Italian gangsters. The other faction was headed by Albert C. Marinelli, a port warden and Tammany stalwart with ties to mainly Italian gangsters: Joe ("The Boss") Masseria, Lucky Luciano, Frankie Yale, Frank Costello, and Albert Anastasia (Katcher 1959). Alfred Connable and Edward Silberfarb (1967) report that during Prohibition, nearly half of the Tammany Democratic clubs were controlled by gangsters. Rothstein was tied to both factions and did favors for both sides—pistol permits, bail bonds, fencing of stolen merchandise, financing

illegal operations, etc. (Katcher 1959). Rothstein is perhaps best remembered by the general public for his alleged involvement in the "Black Sox Scandal," the fixing of the 1919 World Series.

On Sunday night, November 4, 1928, Arnold Rothstein was found staggering in the service entrance of the Park Central Hotel, where he resided; he had been shot once in the abdomen with a small-caliber gun. Rothstein died without naming the person who shot him, and the murder was never solved. It has been attributed to Rothstein's refusal to pay a gambling debt in excess of $300,000—he maintained that the card game was rigged ("Gamblers Hunted in Rothstein Attack" 1928). After his death, federal officials opened many of his safes and files. Papers found in his apartment linked Rothstein to what Charles H. Tuttle, the United States attorney, called "the largest drug ring in the United States" ("Unger Indicted in Drug Conspiracy" 1928: 1; see also "$4,000,000 Narcotics Seized Here, Traced to Rothstein Ring" 1928). Tuttle, in 1930, became the Republican candidate for governor of New York. He lost to Franklin Delano Roosevelt primarily because of the issue of Prohibition (Sinclair 1962). Rothstein left a public estate appraised at $1,757,572; his hidden assets, of course, are not known (S. Smith 1963).

Dutch Schultz

By the time of Prohibition, most important gangsters were Jewish and Italian, though there were Irish criminals involved in bootlegging and related activities (for example, Bill Dwyer). Arthur Flegenheimer, better known as Dutch Schultz, was the "Beer Baron" of the Bronx, and his territory extended well into Manhattan. While Prohibition was in full swing, important gangsters did not pay attention to the numbers (illegal lottery), often referring to it as "nigger pool." With Prohibition on the way out, Schultz began searching for new areas of profit. His attorney, Dixie Davis, also represented some numbers operators, and he engineered Schultz's takeover of the business in Harlem from independent black, Hispanic, and some white numbers bankers. Schultz was able to offer political and physical protection as well as financing—several operators had had a run of costly bad luck. Eventually, the operators were reduced to being employees of the Schultz organization (Sann 1971). Schultz also moved into labor racketeering, and on January 31, 1934, the *New York Times* reported an alliance between officials of the restaurant workers union and the Schultz organization—employees and employers paid for "protection" ("Gang Linked to Union Charged at Trial").

In 1931, the Coll brothers, Schultz gunmen, rebelled and began killing off the Dutchman's drivers and payoff men; the "band of killers would wake the Schultz employees in their homes at the dead of night and kill them in their own bedrooms" (Berger 1935: 17). In a five-month period in 1931, seven Schultz men were murdered ("Schultz Aid Slain; 7th in Five Months" 1931). Schultz responded by placing a $50,000 contract on Coll and began to return the gunplay ("Woman, 2 Men, Slain as Gang Raids Home in Coll Feud" 1932: 1). It was during this feud that Vincent Coll received his nickname, "Mad Dog." His men opened fire at a leader of the Schultz organization, Joe Rao, who was standing in the street near a group of playing children. Rao escaped injury, but a five-year-old child was killed, and four other children lay on the ground wounded. Coll was arrested as one of the shooters, but his attorney, Samuel J. Leibowitz, who later became a New York State supreme court judge, disclosed that the witness to the shooting had a criminal record and a history of providing false testimony. Coll went free (O'Connor 1958).

Another important Prohibition figure would soon play a role in the Schultz-Coll feud. Owen ("Ownie the Killer") Madden was born in England and began his career in crime as the head of the Gophers, a notorious and widely feared gang that controlled the area of Manhattan appropriately named "Hell's Kitchen." In 1915, Madden was sentenced to Sing Sing Prison for ordering the murder of one of his rivals. In 1923 he was paroled and became a partner with George Jean ("Big Frenchy") de Mange, a bootlegger and speakeasy owner who saw the need for the services that Madden and his Hell's Kitchen stalwarts could provide (O'Connor 1958). Madden became a millionaire during Prohibition, and he continued his operations until 1932, when he was arrested for parole violation and returned to prison. A year later he was paroled again and retired to Hot Springs, Arkansas. There he married and lived out his days in comfort. On April 24, 1965, the front page of the *New York Times* reported that Madden, an "ex-gangster" who had given big contributions to charity, had died of chronic emphysema.

In need of money to help finance his campaign against Shultz, Coll kidnapped de Mange and demanded ransom from Madden, who turned over $35,000 for "Big Frenchy's" return. Coll then tried to extort some money from Madden by threatening to kidnap him. The outraged Madden joined forces with Schultz in an all-out war against Coll. They divided the city into zones and dispatched their gunmen to find the "Mad Dog." In the interim, Madden fled to Florida, while Schultz barricaded himself in a bordello surrounded by bodyguards. In the end, one of Coll's bodyguards "fingered" him for Schultz. On January 8, 1932, Coll stepped into a drugstore phone booth and made a call. As he was busy on the telephone his bodyguard discretely left, and two men entered; one carried a Thompson submachine ("tommy") gun. They ordered the customers to remain calm, and several bursts of machine-gun fire entered the phone booth; Coll was almost cut in half by the barrage (O'Connor 1958).

With Coll out of the way, Schultz began to expand into midtown Manhattan until he ran into the area controlled by Irving Wexler, better known as Waxey Gordon. In 1933, warfare finally broke out as Schultz gunmen

made an unsuccessful attempt on Gordon's life ("2 Women Wounded as Gang Opens Fire in Upper Broadway" 1933).

Gordon was another Prohibition success story. In 1933, the *New York Times* cited him as an outstanding example of "what the golden opportunities of the prohibition era could do for a man without scruples and anxious to get ahead" ("Gordon Made by Dry Era" 1933: 6). Born in 1889 in New York's teeming Lower East Side, the son of poor tenement dwellers, Gordon took to the streets. On October 5, 1905, he was arrested for practicing his trade, picking pockets, and sent to the Elmira Reformatory. He was later sent to Sing Sing Prison for robbery, and in 1916 he was released ("Gordon Says He Got Up to $300 a Week" 1933). Gordon married the daughter of a rabbi, but his future looked bleak—then came Prohibition.

Gordon teamed up with Max Greenberg, hijacker and member of the notorious St. Louis gang known as "Egan's Rats." The two were financed by Arnold Rothstein, and they soon had a fleet of rum ships riding the seas and making them rich. Despite Greenberg's murder, Gordon was able to control the beer business in New Jersey (with the help of Abner "Longie" Zwillman) and much of New York City. To avoid legal problems, Gordon ceased importing liquor from abroad and began to invest in breweries. He took advantage of a loophole in the Volstead Act that allowed for the manufacture of beer with less than 0.5 percent alcohol, "near beer." However, brewing near beer requires first manufacturing the real thing and afterwards removing its alcoholic content. The potential for profit is obvious, and Gordon produced thousands of gallons of beer each year (Joselit 1983).

As befitting a multimillionaire, Gordon lived in a castle, complete with a moat, in southern New Jersey. He owned extensive property in New Jersey and Philadelphia, as well as nightclubs and gambling casinos. However, he paid an average of only $33 a year in income taxes from 1928 to 1930 (Schnepper 1978). A second apparent mistake was his feud with Meyer Lansky, who reputedly fed information to the Internal Revenue Service about the source of Gordon's enormous income (Hammer 1975). In 1931, apparently worried about federal efforts to prosecute gangsters for tax violations, Gordon paid $35,000 in federal taxes. It was too little, too late. Elmer Irey, the head of the Treasury Department's Special Intelligence Unit, and the man who "got" Capone, began to work on Gordon. Thomas E. Dewey had been appointed interim United States attorney for the Southern District of New York. Based on Irey's investigation, on November 20, 1933, Gordon was brought to trial; Dewey personally prosecuted the case.

Among other items that Dewey was able to prove was that Gordon had spent $36,000 to install a bar in his $6,000-a-year apartment; this was during the Depression (Schnepper 1978). It took the jury only fifty-one minutes to find Gordon guilty, and on December 1, 1933, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment ("Waxey Gordon Guilty; Gets 10 Years, Is Fined $80,000 for Tax Evasion" 1933). After Gordon's release from federal custody, Prohibition

was over, and he looked for other areas of profit. During the war he was convicted for black-market operations (Hammer 1975), and following the war he was active in heroin trafficking. In 1952, he was one of twenty-three persons indicted in a nationwide case. On December 13, 1951, he was sentenced in a New York State court for narcotics violations. Under New York's "Baume's Law," as a fourth-felony offender Gordon was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life. On April 10, 1952, a federal detainer brought him to Alcatraz to await trial on the federal drug charges. On June 24, 1952, while at Alcatraz, Gordon became ill and died in the prison hospital ("Waxey Gordon Dies in Alcatraz at 63" 1952).

With Coll and Wexler out of the way, Schultz began to experience a new problem—the Internal Revenue Service. He went into "hiding"—at least law-enforcement officers could not find him. Paul Sann (1971) reports that for eighteen months Schultz was actually in Harlem watching over his business interests. On November 29, 1934, the front page of the *New York Times* reported: "Dutch Schultz Surrenders." He subsequently succeeded in obtaining a change of venue based on his New York City notoriety. His case was moved to Syracuse, New York, where a mistrial ("hung jury") resulted. The trial was next moved to a small upstate community, Malone, New York. Schultz travelled to Malone in advance of his trial, bought candy and flowers for the children he visited in the hospital, held a grand ball to which he invited the entire town, and generally endeared himself to the good people of Malone. Schultz was acquitted, a verdict that led the presiding judge, Frederick Bryant, to admonish:

> Your verdict is one that shakes the confidence of law-abiding people. You will go home with the satisfaction—if it is a satisfaction—that you have rendered a blow against law enforcement and given aid and encouragement to the people who flout the law. In all probability, they will commend you. I cannot [R.N. Smith 1982: 166].

Schultz could not safely return to New York City. The federal government had several counts of the original indictment held in abeyance and, to avoid possible double-jeopardy problems, also had Schultz indicted for a series of misdemeanors. In addition, New York State had a warrant outstanding for income-tax evasion; Schultz reportedly owed the state $36,937.18 in back taxes. It was understood that if Schultz could be arrested in New York City, the authorities would be able to institute a prohibitive bail and thus keep him in custody. Schultz travelled to New Jersey and surrendered to the federal charges. Bail was set at an amount that enabled him to remain at liberty (Sann, 1971). The *New York Times* reported that Schultz could not return to New York City because of Mayor La Guardia's threat to have him arrested if he showed up in New York ("Schultz Succumbs to Bullet Wounds without Naming Slayers" 1935). La Guardia often made outrageous public pronouncements—poor civil liberties, great politics. The Dutchman set up head-

quarters in a Newark tavern. Now he faced threats from two sources: Thomas E. Dewey and Lucky Luciano.

In 1935, Thomas E. Dewey, a former Republican United States attorney, was appointed special prosecutor by Gov. Herbert Lehman, a Democrat. Dewey went after Schultz, threatening to convene a special grand jury to investigate the Dutchman's activities. Luciano and his colleagues expected Schultz to be convicted and imprisoned. They were planning to move in on his numbers and restaurant rackets, and Schultz's "victory at Malone" was to them a serious setback. Schultz, for his part, became even more unpredictable, murdering his top aide, Bo Weinberg, whom he (correctly) suspected of dealing with Luciano. The Dutchman was also threatening to kill Dewey, an idea that had been rejected by the other leading gangsters in New York—they were fearful of the "heat" that would result (R.N. Smith 1982).

On the evening of October 25, 1935, Dutch Schultz entered the Palace Chop House and Tavern in Newark, where he had established his headquarters "in exile." With him were his bodyguards Bernard ("Lulu") Rosenkrantz and Abe Landau, as well as Otto ("Abbadabba") Berman, the financial wizard of the Schultz organization. Schultz left the group and entered the men's room; two men suddenly entered the tavern—one was Charles ("Charlie the Bug") Workman, a top professional killer, and the second is believed to have been Emanual ("Mendy") Weiss. The pair opened fire with handguns and a shotgun, and the Schultz men were mortally wounded. Workman entered the men's room and shot the Dutchman, who died about twenty hours later. Less than two hours after the Newark attack, a top Schultz aide, Martin Krompier, was shot and seriously wounded in a Manhattan barbershop. The *New York Times* reported that Krompier's shooting was connected to the takeover of loan-sharking operations in Schultz's territory by Luciano, Lepke Buchalter, and Gurrah Shapiro ("Usury Racket Stirred Gang War" 1935).

Workman was tried for the Schultz murder six years later, and during his trial he suddenly entered a guilty plea. The thirty-four-year-old "Bug" received a life sentence. He was paroled in 1964 and permitted to return to New York under parole supervision. He worked in the garment center for several years until age and illness overcame him and he was placed in a Long Island nursing home. Weiss was electrocuted in 1944 for an unrelated murder.

Lepke Buchalter

The man who "vetoed" the murder of Dewey (Turkus and Feder 1951) was Lepke Buchalter; he probably lived to regret that decision. Lepke (an affectionate expression in Yiddish) was born in New York on February 12, 1897; his father died when Lepke was thirteen, and his destitute mother sent him to live with his older sister. Lepke was arrested and imprisoned for burglary several times. After his release from Sing Sing Prison in 1922, he teamed up with Gurrah Shapiro, and the two began working for "Little Augie" Orgen as labor-industrial racketeers. Shapiro subsequently killed Orgen (Turkus and Feder 1951), and Lepke and Gurrah revolutionized industrial racketeering (Berger 1944: 30): "Instead of using his sluggers and gunmen to terrorize labor unions during strike periods, Lepke worked them directly into the unions. By threat and by violence they controlled one local after another." Meyer Berger (1944: 30) points out that manufacturers who hired Lepke to deal with the unions "soon found themselves wriggling helplessly in the grip of Lepke's smooth but deadly organization. He moved in on them, as he had on the unions."

Until 1940, Lepke was the head of an organization that extorted wealth from the garment, leather, fur, baking, and trucking industries in New York City. Burton Turkus (with Feder, 1951) estimates his income at between $5 million and $10 million annually—this was during the Depression. Berger (1940: 30) notes: "All through the Prohibition era, when other mobsters were splashing headily in alcoholic wealth and getting their names in headlines with a series of competitive killings that strewed urban and suburban landscapes with untidy corpses, Lepke went his quiet way."

Alan Block (1975) presents a slightly different picture of Buchalter's operations. He notes that while Lepke and Gurrah had their share of successes, they also experienced dramatic setbacks. In 1932, for example, Buchalter and Shapiro were invited into the fur industry, where the Protective Fur Dressers Corporation was attempting to put an end to the cutthroat competition that was hurting the business owners. Buchalter and Shapiro were notified when dealers, dressers, or manufacturers were not "cooperating." Bombings, assaults, acid, and arson were the responses. However, the duo had a great deal of difficulty dealing with the fur union, and this led to their sudden exit from the fur industry. On April 24, 1933, Buchalter and Shapiro had their thugs stage an attack on the headquarters of the fur workers' union, where a membership meeting was taking place. Although heavily armed, the gangsters met fierce resistance and were driven out into the street by the irate workers. There they were joined by other workers as news of the attack spread throughout the fur district. A number of men were killed, and several gangsters were severely beaten; seven gangsters were convicted of felonious assault, and this ended Buchalter's activities in the fur industry.

Special prosecutor Thomas E. Dewey began to move against Buchalter and Shapiro, and by 1937, Lepke was forced into hiding, leaving Mendy Weiss in charge. In an effort to remove all possible witnesses, Buchalter ordered a murder rampage; the number of persons killed at his direction is estimated between sixty and eighty (Berger 1940). Turkus reports that the murder binge backfired; the terror of the killings turned loyal Lepke men into terrified informers seeking police protection (1951). Lepke surrendered on August 1, 1937, according to a prearranged plan, to columnist Walter Winchell and F.B.I. director J. Edgar Hoover. There was a $50,000 reward for Buchalter, and reportedly pressure on organized crime had grown as efforts

to capture Lepke intensified. Berger (1940) reports that when one of his gunmen killed the wrong person, an innocent music publisher, there was a great public outcry and demand for Buchalter's apprehension. Turkus (1951) states that Buchalter had been misled into believing that a deal had been arranged with the authorities, that he would only have to stand trial for federal (drug) and not state (murder) charges. On January 2, 1940, Buchalter was convicted in federal court of antitrust and narcotic law violations and sentenced to fourteen years. (Alan Block, 1975, reports that Buchalter's involvement in narcotics was limited to declaring himself in for half of the profits of a lucrative narcotics-smuggling business—simple extortion.)

To Buchalter's dismay, he was subsequently turned over to New York authorities and prosecuted by Dewey for extortion, for which he received a sentence of thirty years to life. Then in 1941, he was prosecuted by Turkus, an assistant district attorney in Brooklyn, for murder along with Mendy Weiss and Louis Capone (no relative of Al's). The three were convicted and, after a protracted legal battle, electrocuted on March 4, 1944. Buchalter has the dubious distinction of being the only major organized-crime-figure to be executed by the state.

Meyer Lansky and Benjamin Siegel

Meyer Lansky was born Maier Suchowljansky in either 1902 or 1904 in Grodno, Byelorussia (now one of the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union, bordering on Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and the Ukraine), and was brought to the United States by his parents along with his brother (Jacob) and a sister in 1911. He attended Public School 34 on the Lower East Side where he completed the eighth grade and left school, at age seventeen, for a job as a tool and die maker (McFadden 1983). His first recorded arrest was on October 24, 1918. Up until that time, the various popular sources report, Meyer was an honest and hardworking craftsman. On that date he was arrested for assaulting Lucky Luciano with a crowbar. According to Hank Messick (1973), Lansky was returning home from work, tools in his hand, when he came upon Luciano beating a woman in an alley, as the young (age twelve) Ben Siegel feebly attempted to stop him; Meyer and his crowbar succeeded. They were all arrested, and Lansky was fined two dollars for disorderly conduct. The judge is reported to have stated to Siegel and Lansky: "You boys have bugs in your heads," and Messick notes that Siegel not only kept the nickname, but lived up to it.

Benjamin Siegel was born on February 28, 1906, and raised in the Williamburg section of Brooklyn with four sisters and a brother, Maurice, who became a respected Beverly Hills physician. Ben grew into a handsome and powerfully built young man who was quick to violence (Jennings 1967). The diminutive Lansky (five feet, four inches, 135 pounds), with his friend Ben Siegel, is reported to have organized floating dice games to supplement his

legitimate income. As they grew successful, the duo surrounded themselves with *shtarkers* (Yiddish for "tough guys"), men such as Phil ("Little Farvel") Kovolick, described as a "hulking brute" (Nash 1975: 195). Their gambling operations attracted the attention of Italian crime boss Joe Masseria, whose men tried to "muscle in." The altercation that ensued resulted in Lansky and Siegel's arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct and two-dollar fines. At this point, apparently admiring the feistiness of these Jews, Luciano intervened—he was working for Masseria—and reconciled the differences between the Jewish and Italian gangsters (Messick 1973). Throughout his career, Luciano was apparently able to act as an intermediary between Jewish and Italian gangsters, a position that enabled him to gain important stature in organized crime.

In 1921, Lansky became an automobile mechanic. His reputation and mechanical ability soon led to servicing and "souping up" stolen vehicles for use by bootleggers. Hauling whiskey, however, was a very risky business, and the "Bug and Meyer Gang" was soon providing the *shtarkers* necessary to ensure these valuable shipments. By the end of Prohibition, Lansky and Siegel were major powers in organized crime.

In 1936 or 1937, Siegel left New York for the West Coast. Turkus (1951) reports that he was sent by eastern gang leaders who were interested in exploiting opportunities in California. Turkus also states that syndicate units in Cleveland, Chicago, and New York sent men to join the Siegel organization on the West Coast, one of them being the notorious Mickey Cohen. Cohen, in his (1975) autobiography, confirms that he was sent to California by Lou Rothkopf of the Cleveland syndicate: "When I was told to come out here and that Benny was out here, I actually wasn't told that I was *fully* under Benny's arm" (1975: 35). Dean Jennings (1967), in his biography of Siegel, asserts that Ben went to California, not at the behest of organized crime bosses, but for personal reasons—he was partial to the glamour that it offered and a French actress who left New York for Hollywood. Mickey Cohen (1975: 41) reports that Jack Dragna, Italian crime Family boss, was not running things well: "The organization had to pour money on to help Dragna at all times. So Benny came out here to get things moving good."

Siegel "got things moving good." His thugs forced bookmakers in California and Arizona to subscribe to the syndicate-backed Trans-America Wire Service (which reported racing results from throughout the country). In California he gained control of the union that represented movie extras and extorted money from the movie industry. He was the (hidden) owner of the California Metals Company in Los Angeles, which handled salvage metals during the Second World War. Although he established himself in a host of rackets, Siegel is best remembered for his activities in Las Vegas. With financial backing from eastern gang leaders, Siegel built the first of the grand-style Las Vegas gambling casino hotels, the Flamingo. However, his activities apparently took on a streak of independence that alienated him from Lansky

and the other gang leaders in the East. At midnight, June 20, 1947, Siegel was hit by a "fusillade of bullets fired through the living room of a Beverly Hills house [home of Virginia Hill] where he was staying" ("Siegel, Gangster, Is Slain on Coast" 1947: 1).

During the 1930s, Lansky was able to arrange with the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista for the syndicate to control gambling in Havana. This domination was not broken until Fidel Castro booted both Batista and the syndicate out of Cuba. Lansky moved his gambling interests into the Bahamas and Haiti. He became known as the premier "money mover" for organized crime, "washing" illegitimate funds and investing them in legitimate enterprises.

During World War II he registered for the draft but was never called. In 1953, he served a brief jail term for running a gambling operation at the Arrowhead Inn in Saratoga Springs, New York. Afterwards, he moved to Florida and concentrated on investments in the southern part of that state. His operations were so lucrative that he is reputed to have kept a former bootlegger associate in Switzerland as his full-time money manager (McFadden 1983).[2] In 1970, fearing an indictment for income-tax evasion, Lansky fled to Israel, where he touched off a twenty-six-month legal fight. Claiming citizenship as a Jew under Israel's "Law of Return," Lansky sought permission to settle in the Holy Land. The United States pressured for his return. Lansky claimed that his efforts before the 1948 War of Independence resulted in badly needed munitions being smuggled out of East Coast ports to Palestine. The United States pressed its claim: Lansky was a dangerous criminal. The case went to Israel's highest court, which ruled that he was not entitled to citizenship because his past made him a "danger to public safety" (McFadden 1983: 21).

When he returned to Miami, Lansky was arrested and posted a cash bail of $250,000. He was ultimately cleared of, or ruled too ill to stand trial on, all the tax evasion, conspiracy, and Las Vegas "skimming" charges against him. He spent his last years in seclusion in a Miami Beach condominium with his second wife. His first marriage, in 1929, had ended in divorce in 1946. The couple had two sons and a daughter. In 1948, Lansky married his second wife, a manicurist at a Manhattan hotel. Lansky died of cancer on January 15, 1983 (McFadden 1983).

Italian Organized Crime in New York

Between 1891 and 1920, 4 million Italians entered America, with the overwhelming majority coming from southern Italy. They were poor and uneducated (Gallo 1981: 33); "It has been estimated that the average Italian immigrant who arrived in New York in 1910 had a total of $17 in his possession." Italian immigrants "found work in the city's construction crews, laboring as ditch diggers, hod carriers, and stone cutters. As long as they had strong

arms, it did not matter if they could not speak English or operate a complex machine" (Gallo 1981: 44). They experienced nativist prejudice and discrimination from employers, organized labor (Gallo 1981), and public officials. Arthur Train (1912: 83), a former assistant district attorney, wrote in 1912 that

> the Italians from the extreme south of the peninsula have fewer of these [American characteristics than the northern Italian], and are apt to be ignorant, lazy, destitute, and superstitious. A considerable percentage, especially of those from the cities, are criminal.

Ironically, in 1912 gambling and prostitution in Manhattan were well organized under the able leadership of Tammany Hall; the southern Italian was not part of this Irish-Jewish cabal.

The Mafia is mentioned in a *New York Times* article on October 21, 1888, quoting New York City police inspector Thomas Byrnes, who stated that he had discovered the murderer of one Antonio Flaccomio to be "an Italian fruit dealer and a member of a *secret society* to which Flaccomio also belonged." Inspector Byrnes went on to report that the *secret society* was known as the Mafia, and the persons involved in the killings were fugitives from Sicily: "There are two principal headquarters of this society in this country—one is in this city and the other in New Orleans—so that members of the society who commit a serious crime in this city find refuge among friends in the South and vice versa" ("By Order of the Mafia" 1888: 8; emphasis added). David Chandler (1975) agrees that this was a Mafia killing, although it appears that Flaccomio was actually killed because of an altercation over a card game. According to follow-up stories in the *New York Times*, no evidence was presented linking either the deceased or the accused to the Mafia.

Whether or not New York had a Mafia is subject to one's definition of the phenomenon. However, without any doubt, New York did have *La Mano Nero*, the Black Hand, and it also is the subject of a great deal of controversy. Francis Ianni states (1972: 52): "The Black Hand activities were the work of individual extortionists or small gangs, and there is no evidence which suggests that there was any higher level of organization or any tie with the *Mafie* in Sicily, or the Camorra in Naples." Thomas Pitkin and Francesco Cordasco (1977) present a different version. They state that leaders of a prominent Black Hand group—Ignazio Saietta ("Lupo the Wolf"; *lupo* means "wolf" in Italian) and Giuseppe Morello—maintained affiliations with Mafia chiefs back in Sicily. When Morello was arrested in 1909 by agents of the United States Secret Service (he and Saietta were also counterfeiters), correspondence was found linking him to Don Vito Ferro, the prominent Sicilian *capomafioso*. It is believed that Ferro spent some time in the United States at the turn of the century.

Arthur Train (1922: 290) points out that the Camorra and Mafia were

never transferred to the United States. Indeed, he argues that many immigrants who were involved with these groups in Italy became quite honest and respectable in the United States: "The number of south Italians who now occupy positions of respectability in New York and who have criminal records on the other side would astound even their compatriots." Train points out, however, that there were Mafia and Camorra gangs in New York and each was headed by a *capo:* "Each *capo maestra* works for himself with his own handful of followers who may or may not enjoy his confidence, and each gang has its own territory held sacred by the others" (1922: 287). Train points out that these gangs rarely attempted blackmail or terrorized anyone but Italians. Occasionally an important *capomafioso* from Sicily arrived and local "friends" had to "get busy for a month or so, raising money for the boys at home and knowing they will reap their reward if they ever go back" (1922: 288). The most popular method of collecting the money was to hold a banquet that all "friends" were required to attend: "No one cares to be conspicuous by reason of his absence and the hero returns to Italy with a large-sized draft on Naples or Palermo" (1922: 301).

In 1895, Giuseppe (Joseph) Petrosino, a New York City police officer, was put in charge of a special squad of Italian detectives and assigned the task of investigating "Italian crime," in particular Black Hand extortion. The latter flourished in Italian ghettos until Prohibition began to offer greater criminal opportunities. Italian families with varying amounts of wealth would receive a crude letter "signed" with a skull or black-inked hand. The letter "requested" money with dire threats offered as an alternative. These threats, often bombings, were sometimes carried out. Petrosino and his squad were quite successful in their work. Petrosino was eventually sent to Italy to check judicial records for lists of criminals about to be released or recently released from Italian prisons so that these men could be picked up on arrival in the United States and returned to Italy. Petrosino left New York on February 9, 1909; on March 12, 1909, he was shot down on a street in Palermo. No one ever apprehended the murderer(s) (Petacco 1974).

By early 1900 there were about 500,000 (mostly southern) Italians in New York City, living in the most deprived social and economic circumstances. The Italian immigration "made fortunes for speculators and landlords, but it also transformed the neighborhood into a kind of human antheap in which suffering, crime, ignorance and filth were the dominant elements" (Petacco 1974: 16). The Italian immigrant provided the cheap labor vital to the expanding capitalism of that era. Robert Merton (1967: 127) states that "functional deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more effectively." Randall Collins (1975: 463) adds that "where legitimate careers are blocked and resources are available for careers in crime, individuals would be expected to move in that direction." Thus, Collins notes, the prominence of Italians in organized crime "is related to the coincidence of several historical factors: the arrival of large numbers of European immigrants from peasant backgrounds who demanded cultural services that the dominant Anglo-Protestant society made illegal; the availability of a patrimonial form of military organization that could be applied to protecting such services; and the relatively late arrival of the Italians in comparison with other ethnic groups (e.g., the Irish) who had acquired control of legitimate channels of political and related economic mobility." Luigi Barzini (1965: 273) adds: "In order to beat rival organizations, criminals of Sicilian descent reproduced the kind of illegal groups they had belonged to in the old country and employed the same rules to make them invincible." Richard Gambino (1974: 304) concludes that, although southern Italian characteristics do not dispose people toward crime, "where the mode of life has been impressed onto organized crime it has made it difficult to combat effectively the criminal activity." He argues that Italian criminals "totally corrupted and perverted traditional codes of la famiglia and vendetta" (1974: 297).

Humbert Nelli (1976: 136) reports that there were Mafia gangs in every American city that had a sizable Sicilian population, "feeding off the common laborer's honest toil and claiming to serve as a means of easing adjustment to American society." Eric Hobsbawm (1969: 686) states that the Mafia "was imported by Sicilian immigrants, who reproduced it in the cities in which they settled, as a ritual brotherhood consisting of loosely linked but otherwise independent and uncoordinated 'families' organized hierarchically." Nelli points out that Mafia organizations "served important social as well as financial functions. The group produced a sense of belonging and of security in numbers. This function was achieved at least in part through the use of initiation ceremonies, passwords and rituals, and rules of conduct with which members must abide" (1976: 138). One of Ianni's (1972: 57) informants describes a Mafia gang operating in Brooklyn in 1928:

> . . . all the old Sicilian "moustaches" used to get together in the backroom of the club—it was a *fratellanze* [brotherhood] and they used to call it the *Unione Siciliana*. They spent a lot of time talking about the old country, drinking wine and playing cards. But these were tough guys too, and they were alky cookers [bootleggers] and pretty much ran things in the neighborhood. They had all of the businesses locked up and they got a piece of everything that was sold.

James Inciardi (1975: 115) describes the *Unione Siciliana:*

> *L'Unione siciliana* emerged in late nineteenth-century New York as a lawful fraternal society designed to advance the interests of Sicilian immigrants. The *Unione* provided its members with life insurance and additional social benefits, and was energetic in the eradication of crime within Sicilian-American communities. . . . Additional branches of *L'Unione siciliana* were chartered wherever new colonies of Sicilians expanded. . . .
>
> The respectability and benevolence of the *Unione* declined as Prohibition approached. First in New York and later in distant city branches, cadres of gangsters

began to infiltrate and pervert the association. *L'Unione siciliana* acquired a dual character: it was open and involved in good works among needy Sicilians, yet it was hidden and malevolent, dealing in theft, murder and vice. With an expanding criminal front, leaders of this "society" became natural catalysts for any racketeers seeking to widen their influence and profit potentials. *L'Unione* membership included old and clannish *Mafia* types who stressed maintenance of the cultural traditions of the Sicilian *Società onorata*. To these were added the younger Americanized factions that were anxious to increase their operations through cooperative agreements with a greater variety of criminal groups, even with those not of their blood. The *Unione* of the 1920s became the object of power struggles, with both orientations contending at local, regional, and national levels for the more advantageous posts. This struggle terminated in 1931 in the Castellammarese war.

The Castellammarese War

In 1930, there were two major factions in Italian organized crime in New York, one headed by Giuseppe ("Joe the Boss") Masseria, and the other by Salvatore Maranzano. Prohibition had enabled the Mafia gangs to break out of the bounds of the "Little Italy" and operate in the wider society. The struggle for domination of Italian-American organized crime in New York became known as the Castellammarese War because many of the Maranzano group came from the small Sicilian coastal town known as Castellammare del Golfo. The Maranzano group consisted mainly of Sicilians, especially the "moustaches," many of whom had fled from Mussolini's prosecution of *mafiosi*. The Masseria group consisted of both Sicilian and non-Sicilian elements: e.g., Lucky Luciano (a Sicilian), Vito Genovese (a Neapolitan), and Frank Costello (born Francesco Castiglia in Lauropoli, Calabria). They were allied with non-Italians such as Meyer Lansky and Benny Siegel. As the war turned against Masseria, five of his leading men—Luciano, Genovese, Ciro Terranova, Frank Livorsi, and Joseph ("Stretch") Stracci—went over to the Maranzano camp, and they failed to notify Joe the Boss. On April 15, 1931, Masseria drove his steel-armored sedan, a massive car with plate glass an inch thick in all of its windows, to a garage near the Nuova Villa Tammaro at 2715 West Fifteenth Street in the Coney Island section of Brooklyn. He then walked to the restaurant for a meal with Luciano and several of his trusted lieutenants. It was Masseria's last meal ("Racket Chief Slain by Gangster Gunfire" 1931). The Castellammarese War was over.

Maranzano irritated many of his followers, particularly the more Americanized Italian gangsters. Joseph Bonanno, who was born in Castellammare del Golfo, was a staunch ally of Maranzano. However, he points out in his autobiography (1983: 137-38):

> Maranzano was old-world Sicilian in temperament and style. But he didn't live in Sicily anymore. In New York he was advisor not only to Sicilians but to American-Italians. Maranzano represented a style that often clashed with that of the Americanized men who surrounded him after the war. It was difficult, for example, for Maranzano even to communicate effectively with many of these men, for they only understood American street cant.

On September 10, 1931, four men carrying pistols entered a suite at 230 Park Avenue, the Grand Central Building in New York City. "One of them ordered the seven men and Miss Frances Samuels, a secretary, to line up against the wall. The others stalked into the private office of Salvatore Maranzano. There was a sound of voices raised in angry dispute; blows, struggling, and finally pistol shots, and the four men dashed out of the suite." Maranzano was found with "his body riddled with bullets and punctured with knife wounds" ("Gang Kills Suspect in Alien Smuggling" 1931: 1). The killers are believed to have been Jews (whom Maranzano and his bodyguards would not recognize) sent by Meyer Lansky and Benny Siegel at the behest of Luciano. The killers flashed badges, and apparently Maranzano and his bodyguards believed them to be federal agents who had visited him before. They attempted to kill him silently with knives, and when he fought back, they shot him to death.

In the aftermath of the Castellammarese War, five Italian-American crime Families emerged. They continue to maintain distinct identities.

The Luciano Family

Luciano was born in Lercara Friddi, a sulphur-mining area in western Sicily, in 1897. He arrived in New York with his parents, Antonio and Rosalia Lucania, early in 1907, and the family settled on Manhattan's Lower East Side. Nelli (1976) reports that, although Luciano's conduct in school was satisfactory, his academic record was poor and made worse by chronic truancy. He left school when he reached the age of fourteen and secured employment as a shipping boy in a hat factory. He became a member of the Five Points Gang, a drug user and pusher, and on June 26, 1916, at age eighteen, was found guilty of possessing narcotics and sent to a reformatory for six months (Nelli 1976).

With the advent of Prohibition, Luciano emerged as a leader in the Masseria Family. With the death of Masseria and Maranzano in 1931, Luciano became the most important Italian organized-crime figure in New York, a status he continued to enjoy until 1935. In that year, investigators for Thomas E. Dewey discovered an extensive prostitution network which, although independent at one time, had been taken over by Luciano henchmen headed by David ("Little Davie") Betillo. In a single raid, Dewey's investigators arrested prostitutes, madams, and "bookers" (pimps). They were pressured and cajoled into testifying against Luciano, who protested that he had no knowledge of or involvement in Betillo's activities. Dewey charged that Betillo had acted on behalf of Luciano to "organize" two hundred bordellos

and three thousand prostitutes into a $12 million-a-year business. On June 7, 1936, Luciano was found guilty of sixty-one counts of compulsory prostitution and sentenced to a term of thirty to sixty years in prison (R.N. Smith 1982).

Luciano languished in Clinton State Prison at Dannemora while war raged in Europe and the Pacific. By May 1942, German submarines operating in American coastal waters had sunk 272 U.S. ships. It was suspected that information on American shipping was being leaked to the Germans by people working in eastern ports. It was also suspected, incorrectly, that German submarines were being supplied by American fishing boats. The spectre of sabotage was raised when the luxury liner *Normandie*, which had been refitted as a naval vessel, rolled over in flames while harbored in the Hudson River.

With the help of Frank Hogan, Dewey's successor as Manhattan district attorney, naval intelligence officials met with Joseph ("Socks") Lanza, the vicious criminal "czar" of the Fulton Fish Market, who was under indictment for conspiracy and extortion. Lanza agreed to help, but noted that his influence was limited; he suggested the man to see was Lucky Luciano. Luciano was transferred to Great Meadow Prison, which is closer to New York City, and there he met with naval intelligence officers.

Through Meyer Lansky the word went out. According to Rodney Campbell (1977), in addition to ordering port workers and fishermen to "keep alert," crime figures helped to place intelligence operatives in key areas by supplying them with union cards and securing positions for them on the waterfront, on fishing boats, and in waterfront bars, restaurants, and hotels. They also provided another important service. At the request of naval officials they prevented strikes and other forms of labor unrest that could interrupt wartime shipping. While Campbell provides documentation of Luciano's domestic role during the war, his data on Luciano's role in the invasion of Sicily are tenuous. Campbell states that Luciano had word sent to Sicilian *capo-mafiosi* to assist the Allied landing. However, *mafiosi* did not need encouragement from Luciano—their desire to rid the island of Mussolini's iron hand was incentive enough. R.N. Smith presents a more modest claim (1982: 572): "Sicilians expelled by Mussolini proved willing to help devise maps of possible landing sites. The island coastline and the contour of land off the coast were assessed with the help of underworld informants."

In 1945, then-governor Thomas E. Dewey received a petition for executive clemency on behalf of Luciano, citing his efforts during the war. On January 3, 1946, the governor announced that Luciano would be released from prison and deported to Italy. Luciano left the United States on February 9, 1946. He died of a heart attack while in Italian exile in 1962.

With Luciano in prison and then deported to Italy, the Family was headed by Frank Costello. Christened Francesco Castiglia, Costello was born on January 26, 1891, in Calabria. Like several other Italian criminals, he affected an Irish surname, something that was certainly no hindrance in New York, where the Irish dominated Tammany and Tammany dominated the city. In

1915 he served a ten-month sentence for carrying a concealed weapon. By 1923, he was a successful bootlegger working for Bill Dwyer, an ex-longshoreman turned rumrunner, who brought liquor from Canada across the Great Lakes in armored speedboats (Talese 1965: 67–68). Costello moved into gambling and eventually became a successful (and legitimate) real estate dealer.

Known as "King of the Slots," Costello operated an extensive network of the "one-armed bandits" in New York City until Mayor Fiorello La Guardia went on a highly publicized campaign to rid the city of "that bum." Many sources report that Costello was then invited to bring his slot machines to New Orleans by the political boss of Louisiana, United States Senator Huey P. Long. Costello moved into New Orleans and placed Philip ("Dandy Phil") Kastel in charge. The "Kingfish's" biographer, T. Harry Williams (1969), questions Long's connection to Costello. Costello had informed a federal grand jury that Long had invited him into New Orleans to set up a thousand slot machines for a fee of thirty dollars per machine. However, Williams argues that such a setup would require police protection in a city that in 1935 was controlled by Semmes Walmsley, a bitter enemy of the Kingfish.

Costello was noted for his political influence. In one widely reported incident in 1943, a telephone wiretap revealed Thomas A. Aurelio thanking Costello for making him the Democratic nominee for judge of the New York Supreme Court (court of general, not appellate, jurisdiction) from Manhattan. Aurelio pledged "undying loyalty" to which "Francesco" responded: "When I tell you something is in the bag, you can rest assured" ("Frank Costello Dies of Coronary at 82" 1972). Despite a grand-jury probe, Aurelio was elected and served with distinction, without any hint of favoritism toward organized crime. Costello, it appears, was motivated more by ethnic than criminal interests. He had broken Irish domination over judicial appointments in Manhattan.

In 1949, Costello was asked to serve as vice-chairman of a Salvation Army fund-raising drive. He gladly accepted and held a fund-raising party at the Copacabana to which judges and other leading political figures were invited. The party raised $3,500, and Costello added another $6,500 of his own, sending the Salvation Army a check for $10,000. However, the newspapers found out about the party, and the public reaction was indignant (Talese 1965).

In 1951, Costello appeared before the Kefauver Committee[3] and was exposed on national television as a major crime figure. For the television viewers, however, only Costello's hands were seen; his lawyer had insisted that Costello not be televised. His evasive responses, coupled with a dramatic walkout, eventually led to an eighteen-month term for contempt of the Senate. In 1952, the government moved against him for income-tax evasion, for which he received a sentence of five years imprisonment in 1954. In 1956 his attorney, the noted criminal lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, proved that

the conviction had been based on illegal wiretaps, and Costello was freed. Even while he was in prison, Costello's power continued unabated. While on a prison visit, Edward Bennett Williams mentioned to Costello that he wanted, but had been unable to purchase, tickets for the Broadway musical hit *My Fair Lady*. Later that same day, Williams reported, his doorbell at home rang: "A broad-shouldered man thrust an envelope in his hands and disappeared"; it contained four tickets for that evening's "sold out" performance ("Frank Costello Dies of Coronary at 82" 1972: 21).

Costello routinely travelled without any bodyguards. On May 2, 1957, he had an appointment to meet Anthony ("Tony Bender") Strollo, Family *caporegime* in charge of Greenwich Village. The meeting, at Chander's Restaurant on East Forty-Ninth Street, had been arranged by Vito Genovese, Family *sottocapo* (underboss). With Bender at the restaurant was Vincent Mauro (also known as Vincent Bruno). Mauro left but monitored Costello's movements by telephone. He spoke to an individual on a pay phone, outside of which a double-parked car was waiting for word that Costello was on his way home to his apartment on Central Park West. Costello rushed to the elevator of the luxury building when a passing fat man yelled: "This is for you Frank," and fired a revolver at Costello's face from a distance of six to ten feet. The bullet hit Costello in the head but caused only superficial damage. When questioned by the authorities, Costello insisted he did not recognize his assailant, the easily recognizable Vincent ("The Chin") Gigante, an obese ex-pugilist and Genovese gunman. Several months later, Albert Anastasia, Costello's close ally and boss of the Mineo Family, was murdered, and Costello retired. Vito Genovese became boss of the Luciano Family (Katz 1973).

The man who allegedly ordered the bungled attempt on Costello was born near Naples on November 27, 1897. At age fifteen he arrived in New York and lived with his family in the Little Italy of downtown Manhattan. Beginning as a street thief, Genovese graduated to working as a collector for the Italian lottery and eventually became an associate of Lucky Luciano. When his first wife died of tuberculosis in 1931, Genovese stated his intention of marrying Anna Petillo—she was already married. Twelve days later, Mr. Petillo was strangled to death, and Genovese married the widow Petillo. After twelve years of marriage, Anna Genovese sued him for support and denounced Vito in court as a racketeer with a huge income. The much-feared crime boss did nothing. Nicholas Gage (1972) reports that Genovese was too much in love with her to have her killed.

Genovese was becoming a power in organized crime and was making large profits from narcotics. In 1934, however, there was a bungled murder, that of Ferdinand ("The Shadow") Boccia, and Genovese was forced to flee to Italy in order to avoid prosecution; he took $750,000 with him. In Italy he was reputed to have been a confidant of Benito Mussolini—until the American invasion. At that time he gained the confidence of the American military authorities, for whom he acted as an interpreter. His position enabled him to become a major black marketeer, until he was identified as an American fugitive and returned to the United States to stand trial. While he was awaiting trial, a key witness was poisoned while in protective custody, and Genovese went free.

On April 14, 1959, Genovese, along with fourteen others, was convicted of conspiracy to violate narcotics laws and received a fifteen-year federal sentence. Ralph Salerno, a former New York City detective, says about the conviction:

> Oddly enough, several Bosses have gone to jail on evidence that knowledgeable people find questionable. One such case is that of Vito Genovese, a powerful New York family Boss who went to prison in April 1959 on a federal narcotics conviction. Genovese's family had indeed been involved in narcotics, but Nelson Cantellops, a narcotics courier, swore in court that he had personally met and talked with Genovese about details of the business. To anyone who understands the protocol and insulation procedures of Cosa Nostra, this testimony is almost unbelievable [Salerno 1969: 157].

On February 14, 1969, while serving his fifteen-year sentence, Genovese died. However, the group that he headed is still usually referred to as the *Genovese Family*, despite numerous changes in leadership.

The Mineo Family

Al Mineo (real name Manfredi) was a close ally of Masseria who was killed by Maranzano gunmen during the Castellammarese War. After the death of Masseria, Frank Scalise,* who had defected from the Mineo Family early in the war, was made boss of that same Family. He became a close confidant of Maranzano and after Maranzano's death was replaced as boss by Vincent Mangano. Bonanno (1983) states that this was done to appease Lucky Luciano. In 1951, Mangano disappeared—presumably murdered at the direction of Family *sottocapo* Albert Anastasia, who then became Family boss.

Albert Anastasia was born Umberto Anastasio in Tropea, Italy, on September 26, 1902. He entered the United States in 1919 and reportedly changed his name to save his family some embarrassment as a result of his 1921 arrest for murdering a fellow longshoreman (Freeman 1957: 12). His brother Anthony ("Tough Tony") Anastasio became the official ruler of the Brooklyn waterfront as head of Local 1814 of the International Longshoremen's Union (ILA); Albert became the unofficial ruler of these same docks. He was widely feared even among his associates and reportedly enjoyed the title "Executioner" (Berger 1957).

In 1923, Anastasia was sentenced to two years of imprisonment for possessing a firearm, although this did not prevent him from serving stateside in the United States Army during World War II. In 1955, he served a one-

year sentence for income-tax evasion. Anastasia lived in a home along the Palisades in Fort Lee, New Jersey—a home with a seven-foot barbed wire fence, Doberman pinschers, and bodyguards. On October 25, 1957, he was getting his hair cut (some say it was a shave), when his bodyguard conveniently absented himself. Two gunmen entered, and the "Executioner" was executed. (The barbershop was located in the Park Sheraton, which in 1928 was known as the Park Central, the hotel where Arnold Rothstein was killed.) The death of Anastasia has been linked to the attempt on the life of Frank Costello, an act designed to thwart a retaliatory war; Anastasia was a close friend of Costello (Berger 1957). *Sottocapo* Carlo Gambino, believed to be in league with Vito Genovese, became the boss of the Family.

Carlo Gambino. Born in Palermo on August 24, 1900, Carlo arrived in the United States (an illegal alien) in 1921. He resided in Brooklyn, assisted by numerous relatives who had arrived earlier. In turn, he helped his brothers Paolo (Paul), born 1904, and Giuseppe (Joseph), born 1908, when they arrived in the United States. His boyhood friend from Palermo, Gaetano Lucchese, was already in the United States and rising in the ranks of organized crime, first under Masseria and then, as a defector, under Maranzano. Gambino, who was nominally on the side of "Joe the Boss," appears not to have actively participated in the Castellammarese War. He followed Lucchese into the Maranzano camp and after Maranzano's death moved into the ranks of the Mineo Family, eventually becoming a *caporegime* under Vincent Mangano.

After Prohibition, Gambino continued in the bootlegging business and in 1939 received a twenty-two-month sentence for conspiracy to defraud the United States of liquor taxes. Eight months later, the conviction was thrown out because the evidence had been based on illegal wiretaps. The Second World War made Gambino a millionaire; it also prevented him from being deported to Italy. Valachi testified before a Senate committee that Gambino "made over a million dollars from ration stamps during the war. The stamps came out of the O.P.A.'s offices. First Carlo's boys would steal them. Then, when the Government started hiding them in banks, Carlo made contact and the O.P.A. men sold him the stamps" (Gage 1975: 26). Paul Meskil (1973: 58) states:

> The wartime rationing of gasoline, meat, and groceries opened a nationwide black market that the American public patronized as eagerly as it had once bought bootleg booze. . . .
>
> Carlo went into the stamp-collecting business with his brother Paul and New Jersey mobster Settimo (Big Sam) Accardi. At first, they sent teams of safecrackers to steal ration stamps from the vaults of the Office of Price Administration. Then they purchased the stamps directly from dishonest OPA officials.

When Albert Anastasia became Family boss, he made Gambino the *sottocapo*. When Anastasia was murdered in 1957, Gambino became the boss

of reputedly the largest and most influential crime Family in the country. A strong family man, Gambino had one daughter, married to the son of Lucchese, and three sons, who operate trucking firms in the garment center. Gambino's wife died in 1971. In 1970 he was indicted for conspiracy to hijack an armored car carrying over $3 million, but the case was never brought to trial because of his poor health. In that same year, the Supreme Court upheld a 1967 deportation order, but once again ill health prevented any action.

In addition to his Family's illegal activities, from which he received an income, Gambino owned (directly or through fronts) many legitimate businesses, including meat markets, bakeries, nightclubs, linen-supply companies, and restaurants. His "SGS Associates Public and Labor Relations" firm had an uncanny knack for resolving labor disputes for its impressive list of clients, including Wellington Associates (real estate including the Chrysler Building), builder William Levitt, Bond Clothes, and the Flower and Fifth Avenue Hospital. The firm closed in 1965 after an investigation by state and federal authorities (Meskil 1973).

On October 15, 1975, Gambino died of natural causes in his Massapequa, Long Island, home. The Family he headed is still referred to as the Gambino Family.

The Reina Family

Gaetano ("Tommy") Reina headed one of the five Families in New York City "which formed spontaneously as Sicilian immigrants settled there" (Bonanno 1983: 84). Two of the leading men in the Reina Family were Gaetano Gagliano and Tommy Lucchese. Bonanno states that because of the power of Masseria, Reina had to be careful not to offend him, "and he generally toed the Masseria line" (1983: 85). At the start of the Castellammarese War, Reina apparently began talking (privately) against Masseria: "An informant within Reina's Family relayed these sentiments to Reina's *paesano* from Corleone, Peter Morello. And Morello reported it to Masseria" (Bonanno 1983: 106). On February 26, 1930, Reina was killed by the blast of a sawed-off shotgun. Bonanno reports that Masseria backed one of his own supporters, Joe Pinzola, to head the Reina Family. Gaetano ("Tommy") Gagliano formed a splinter group and challenged Pinzola and Masseria. He was joined by Tommy Lucchese, who was designated *sottocapo* of the (new) Gagliano Family. Gagliano emerged on the side of the victorious Salvatore Martanzano, and his leadership lasted until 1953, when he died of natural causes. Pinzola was killed during the Masseria-Martanzano conflict.

Lucchese was born in Palermo, Sicily, in 1900 and came to the United States in 1911. In 1919 he lost his right index finger in a machine-shop accident. His obituary in the *New York Times* states that the accident "apparently soured him on the workingman's life and steered him into a life of crime" (July 14, 1967: 31). As a result of the accident and his first arrest

(for car theft in 1921), Lucchese was nicknamed "Three-Finger Brown," after a pitcher for the Chicago Cubs—the policeman who fingerprinted Lucchese was a fan of Mordecai ("Three-Finger") Brown and wrote that name down under the "alias" section of the fingerprint card. He was naturalized in 1943, despite the 1921 conviction, and in 1949 received a "certificate of good conduct" which restored his right to vote.

Virgil Peterson (1983: 403) states that Lucchese was very big in gambling, including numbers (illegal lottery) and bookmaking in Queens, New York. One of the principal members of his Family (and subsequent boss himself), Anthony ("Ducks") Corallo, was a major labor racketeer.[5] "Police officials listed eight dress firms in New York City in which Lucchese was a part owner, and he had similar holdings in Scranton, Pennsylvania." His firms in New York City were nonunion and, Peterson notes, "strangely, free from labor troubles." Lucchese was arrested for vagrancy on November 18, 1935—his last arrest.

Lucchese lived in an expensive home in Lido Beach, Long Island. His son Robert is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and an Air Force officer. Lucchese's daughter Frances went to Vassar College and later married the son of Carlo Gambino. Lucchese died of natural causes on July 13, 1967. His Family is, however, usually referred to as the Lucchese Family.

The Profaci Family

Joseph Profaci was born in Palermo on October 2, 1897; he came to the United States and never served a prison sentence. However, he did manage to owe the United States $1.5 million in income taxes. Profaci owned numerous (at least twenty) legitimate businesses and was the largest single importer of olive oil into the United States. In addition to his modest Brooklyn home, he owned a luxurious house in Miami Beach and a hunting lodge ("Profaci Dies of Cancer" 1962). Bonanno (1983) reports that at the outbreak of the Castellammarese War, Profaci was the boss of his own Family. While he sided with Maranzano, his Family did not participate in the conflict: "Maranzano urged Profaci to remain officially neutral and to act as an intermediary with other groups" (1983: 85).

Profaci, although clean shaven, was clearly a "mustache," faithful to Old World traditions. He was a devoted family man, devoid of any apparent extramarital romantic interests. A religious person, his profession notwithstanding, Profaci was a faithful churchgoer, a friend of the pastor, and a large contributor to church charities. One of the churches in the Bensonhurst–Bath Beach section of Brooklyn, where he lived, had a statue adorned with a crown of jewels worth several thousand dollars. Some reports state that Profaci had been the contributor of the crown. In any event, James ("Bucky") Ammino decided to steal the crown—an outrage Profaci ordered "corrected." Although the crown was returned, Bucky failed to restore three missing diamonds. His body was subsequently found, and lest the meaning of his death be misinterpreted, a set of rosary beads was wrapped around his neck (Martin 1963).

Profaci's traditionalism was viewed as despotic by some members of his Family; he apparently demanded a big percentage of all their illegal profits, and he placed "blood" and old friendships above business; old friends and relatives received larger shares of Family opportunities than the younger men in his ranks. In 1959, a policy (illegal lottery) operator, Frank ("Frankie Shots") Abbatemarco, was murdered on orders from Profaci. The contract was carried out by Joseph ("Joe Jelly") Gioielli, a short, obese, but vicious, killer and stalwart of the Gallo brothers, a Red Hook group that was part of the Profaci Family. The brothers, Lawrence ("Larry"), Albert ("Kid Blast"), and Joseph ("Crazy Joe") Gallo, expected to receive a large share of Abbatemarco's gambling operations. Instead, Profaci divided it up among his friends and relatives. The Gallo brothers fumed until February, 1961. Then, in one twenty-four-hour period, they abducted four of Profaci's closest associates, but the boss himself evaded capture. What transpired afterwards would rival the Roman plots in the days of the Caesars.

Profaci agreed to be more generous with the Gallo faction. However, several Gallo men secretly went over to the Profaci side, and on August 20, 1961, they lured Larry Gallo to the Sahara Lounge in Brooklyn. At an early hour in the morning, before the lounge had opened for business, Carmine ("The Snake") Persico and another man placed a rope around Larry's neck and slowly began to squeeze the life out of him. A police sergeant came into the lounge apparently only minutes before the victim would have expired—he had already lost control of his bowels and bladder. The officer noticed Larry's feet sticking out behind the bar, and he saw the two men dash from the darkened room out a side door. His patrolman driver waiting outside attempted to stop the two men; he was shot in the face and suffered a wound in the right cheek. Larry survived the ordeal, his neck badly scarred.

On that same day Joe Jelly was "put to sleep with the fishes"—his coat was dumped on the street near Gallo headquarters wrapped around several fresh fish. The "war" was on, but it was a rather one-sided affair; at least twelve men were killed, mostly Gallo loyalists. The Gallo group "took to the mattresses"—that is, they took refuge in their Red Hook, Brooklyn, headquarters at 49–51 President Street, a block away from the Union Street 76th Police Precinct House. A special squad of New York City detectives headed by Ramond V. Martin (who wrote a book on the subject, 1963) was assigned to maintain surveillance of the area, and it was the police who probably saved the Gallos from being completely wiped out by Profaci gunmen. During this period, the Gallos were responsible for saving several neighborhood youngsters from a building fire. They became local heroes, and the news media reported extensively on their exploits. On May 11, 1961, in an effort to replenish income that was dwindling as a result of the "war," Joey Gallo attempted to extort money from the owner of several bars. The victim refused,

so Joey performed his best "Richard Widmark," explaining to the businessman that he could meet with an unfortunate "accident." It was no accident that two detectives were in the bar and Gallo received a lengthy prison sentence. In 1968, Larry Gallo died of cancer.

In 1962, Profaci died, and his place was taken by Joseph Magliocco, his brother-in-law. Magliocco died of natural causes at the end of 1963, and his place was taken by Joseph Colombo, Sr. A truce was finally arranged between the two factions in 1964. Ralph Salerno (with Tompkins, 1969) reports that one condition of the truce was that several top Gallo men were "made" (inducted as members of the Colombo Family).

While in prison, Crazy Joey continued to "raise hell." He so annoyed some of his fellow inmates in Attica that several of them threw him off a tier. Transferred to another prison, Joey befriended many black inmates, several of whom he recruited for his Brooklyn organization. In May, 1971, he was released from prison, and the intrigue reached new heights.

There appears to be general agreement over how Joseph Colombo was chosen to succeed Magliocco as boss of the Profaci Family. There was a plot to kill two other Family chieftains, Carlo Gambino and Thomas Lucchese, and Colombo informed Gambino of the plot. Some accounts say that the person who was supposed to effect the murders was Colombo, on behalf of Joseph Bonanno, boss of the Bonanno Family. Salerno (with Tompkins, 1969) reports that Bonanno and Joseph Magliocco, *sottocapo* of the Profaci Family, were behind the plot. Gay Talese (1971) places responsibility on Magliocco, and Bonanno (1983) denies any involvement. He blames his cousin, Stefano Magaddino, Buffalo, New York, Family boss, for "disseminating the story that Joe Bonanno wanted to kill Gambino and Lucchese. . . ." (1983: 235). In any event, Magliocco died, and Joseph Colombo was chosen by the "commission" to head the Profaci Family (Bonanno 1983).

In 1970, Colombo founded the Italian-American Civil Rights League and led in the daily picketing of New York FBI headquarters, generating a great deal of publicity. Colombo and the league succeeded in having all references to the "Mafia" or "Cosa Nostra" deleted from the script of *The Godfather* as well as the television series *The FBI*. Atty. Gen. John Mitchell and Gov. Nelson Rockefeller ordered their employees to refrain from using such references.

The league raised large sums of money through dues and testimonial dinners and held an "Annual Unity Day" rally which drew about 50,000 persons to Columbus Circle in New York. Nicholas Gage notes that the "rally conspicuously closed stores in neighborhoods controlled by the Mafia: New York's waterfront was virtually shut down . . . and almost every politician in the city joined" the 1970 celebration (1972: 172). There were articles in magazines and newspapers about Colombo and the league, and the boss began to portray himself as a civil rights leader who was simply misunderstood by the police.

Reports state that other Family bosses, particularly Carlo Gambino, did not look favorably on the activity of Colombo and the league, either because Colombo failed to share the financial fruits or because they resented the publicity—perhaps both. At the Second Annual Unity Day rally on June 28, 1971, in view of thousands, a lone black man, wearing a camera and apparently presenting himself as a newsman, approached Colombo, pulled out a gun, and shot him. The gunman, twenty-four-year-old Jerome A. Johnson, was immediately shot to death: "Johnson's killer escaped as professionally as he had carried out his mission, shooting Johnson three times even as police clustered around" (Gage 1972: 171). Colombo remained paralyzed until his death.

Interest focused on Jerome Johnson. He was never connected to organized crime, although he had a criminal record and was known as a violent person. Suspicion immediately centered on Joey Gallo; he had reason to dislike the Family boss and was known to have as his associates black criminals. The day after Colombo was shot, the *New York Times* stated (Gage 1971b: 21): "When Joseph Gallo was released in May from prison he was reported to have complained that the lot of his faction within the family had not improved much in his absence. He was also said to have questioned Colombo's involvement in the Italian Civil Rights League as drawing undue attention to the family." On April 7, 1972, Joey Gallo was dining at Umberto's Clam House in Lower Manhattan with his associate-bodyguard, Peter ("Pete the Greek") Diapoulas, Pete's girlfriend, Joey's fiancée and her daughter, and Joey's sister. Three Colombo Family gunmen entered the restaurant and shot Gallo to death; Diapoulas was wounded after he exchanged fire with the killers.

Despite the death of Joseph Colombo, the Family is usually referred to as the Colombo Family.

The Bonanno Family

We know more about Joseph ("Don Peppino") Bonanno than other crime figures because he was the subject of the biography by Gay Talese (1971) and authored his own autobiography (with Segio Lalli, 1983). Bonanno states that his father, Salvatore ("Don Turridu"), was the head of the Bonanno clan in Castellammare and a "man of honor" (*mafioso*). He left Sicily for the United States with his wife and three-year-old son, Giuseppe, in 1908 to avoid prosecution (Bonanno does not say for what crime). In 1911, at the request of his brothers in Castellammare, Don Turridu returned home with his wife and child. He died in 1915 of a heart attack.

Bonanno states that he was attending the nautical preparatory school in Trapani when Mussolini came to power. He claims that his anti-Fascist activities forced him to leave, and he entered the United States illegally in 1924. He quickly found help and refuge amongst friends and family from Castel-

lammare. His cousin Stefano Magaddino was already a criminal power in Buffalo, and Bonanno eventually became involved in bootlegging with the Castellammare clan in Brooklyn under Salvatore Maranzano. During the Masseria-Maranzano conflict, Bonanno became an aide to Maranzano and was seen as a leader of the Castellammare group arrayed against Joe, the boss. After Maranzano's murder, a meeting of Family members was held, and Bonanno was elected Father (a term he uses for "boss") of what became known as the Bonanno Family. Bonanno successfully parlayed income received as boss of his own Family into legitimate enterprises such as garment and cheese manufacturing.

Although he had been arrested numerous times, until 1983 Bonanno never served a prison term. In 1945 he was convicted for a violation of the rent-control law and paid a $450 fine. In 1959, a federal grand jury indicted him for conspiracy to obstruct justice in the aftermath of the (in)famous meeting of Family bosses at Apalachin, New York. In that year, there had been an attempt on the life of Frank Costello, and Albert Anastasia had been murdered—events that apparently required a top-level conference. New York state police sergeant Edgar Croswell became suspicious of the activities at the home of Joseph M. Barbara, whom he knew to be an "organized-crime figure." Barbara was from Castellammare and had become the wealthy owner of a soda-pop distributing business and a bottling plant outside of Endicott, New York. His estate in Apalachin was about six miles away. The sergeant had discovered a number of expensive automobiles with out-of-state license plates parked at the Barbara estate. "There was nothing Croswell could legally do about Barbara's visitors, but by Saturday, November 14, 1957, with what he figured to be as many as seventy guests assembled, Croswell could no longer stifle his curiosity. He organized what few deputies he had and conducted a raid on Barbara's house, one merely, as he explained later, to see if anything criminal was going on or if Barbara's guests were wanted on any outstanding warrants" (Brashler 1977: 144). Ralph Salerno (with Tompkins) states that "within minutes dozens of well-dressed men ran out of the house and across the fields in all directions" (1969: 298). Using roadblocks and reinforcements, the police reportedly took sixty-three men into custody, although this figure is often disputed. Bonanno was reported to have been at the meeting, and his driver's license was confiscated; but he claims not to have been there but at a private meeting in a nearby motel. Frederic Sondern (1959: 36) reports: "One by one they were summoned to Sergeant Croswell's office, gave their names and addresses, took off their shoes, emptied their pockets as troopers searched and watched."

In 1959, Bonanno and other leading crime figures were indicted for refusing to answer questions as to the purpose of the meeting at Apalachin. Bonanno's case was separated from the others when he had a heart attack, but they were all found guilty. The verdict was later overturned on appeal. The court concluded that the people at the Barbara estate had been taken into

custody, detained, and searched without probable cause that a crime had been committed.

In 1963 came the alleged plot against Gambino and Lucchese, and Bonanno sought, and was denied, Canadian citizenship. In February, 1964, while Bonanno was still in Canada, Family *capiregime* chose his son Bill *consigliere*.[6] The elevation of the young Bonanno was opposed from within and without the Bonanno Family. This act coupled with the plot against Gambino and Lucchese resulted in a "summons" for Joseph Bonanno to appear before the "national commission," of which he was one of the nine members; Bonanno declined. On October 21, 1964, Bonanno and his attorney were standing in front of a luxury apartment house in Manhattan, where they had sought shelter from the rain (1983: 260);

> . . . two men grabbed me from behind by each arm and immediately forced me toward the nearby street corner.
>
> . . . "Come on, Joe, my boss wants you. . . . As they rushed me toward the corner, I heard Maloney [Bonanno's attorney] shouting after us. He was saying something about my being his client and they couldn't take me away like that. A pistol shot pinged the sidewalk. Maloney retreated.

Bonanno reports that he was kidnapped by two of his cousins, the son and brother of Stefano Magaddino, and held in a rural farmhouse for more than six weeks. Federal officials called it a hoax, an effort by Bonanno to avoid appearing before a grand jury investigating organized crime. Bonanno states that following his release, he remained in hiding in his Tucson home for more than a year. In the meantime, a revolt broke out within the Bonanno Family led by *caporegime* Gasper DiGregorio, Bill Bonanno's godfather and best man at the wedding of Fay and Joseph Bonanno.

On January 28, 1966, in an effort to reestablish unity, Bill Bonanno and several Family members loyal to his father went to Troutman Street in Brooklyn to meet with DiGregorio. The unity meeting turned out to be an ambush, and the young Bonanno narrowly escaped in an exchange of gunfire. On May 18, 1966, Joseph Bonanno reappeared and the war/revolt raged on. DiGregorio eventually withdrew, and the commission turned the Family over to Paul Sciacca. Joseph Bonanno retired to his Tucson home, leaving a three-man committee to fill the leadership until the "loyalists" could select a new boss. Despite Bonanno's retirement, the Family is still referred to as the Bonanno Family, something which Bonanno (1983: 292) decried:

> . . . it is improper for people still to refer to this Family as the Bonanno Family. It stopped being the Bonanno Family when I retired. In Sicily, a Family is sometimes likened to a *cosca*—an artichoke. The Family members are like the artichoke leaves and the Father is like the central stem on which they all hang. Remove the central stem and all you have is a lot of separate leaves. When I left New York to retire, all the separate leaves had to find themselves another stem.[7]

Jewish-Italian Cooperation: Murder, Inc.

In addition to the unparalleled level of criminal violence, Prohibition also encouraged cooperation among criminals across ethnic lines. By 1934, organized-crime leaders in the New York metropolitan area, Jewish and Italian, were meeting regularly to iron out differences and arrange business deals. Each recognized the interests of the others, the territory and/or enterprises each controlled. Out of this configuration emerged a unit of criminals dubbed by the press "Murder, Inc."

The setting is the East New York–Brownsville section of Brooklyn, a Jewish ghetto, and the adjoining neighborhood of Ocean Hill, an Italian ghetto. The story begins in the spring of 1930, when Abe ("Kid Twist") Reles, Martin ("Buggy") Goldstein, and Philip ("Pittsburgh Phil") Strauss decided to make some "easy" money by going into the pinball-machine business—renting the machines to candy stores and poolrooms. It was a good idea, but hardly original. In fact, the pinball business and criminal activities in that part of Brooklyn were controlled by the notorious Shapiro brothers, Irving, Meyer, and Willie. To deal with the anticipated problem, the boys from East New York–Brownsville teamed up with a crew of Italian criminals from Ocean Hill led by the Maione brothers, Harry ("Happy") and "Duke," and Frank ("The Dasher") Abbandando. They began to make inroads into the business controlled by the Shapiros, and with profits from the pinball machines they entered the loansharking business. The Shapiro brothers responded.

On June 11, 1930, one of the Reles group was killed, and he and Goldstein were wounded. Meyer Shapiro then abducted Reles's girlfriend, whom he beat and raped. The Reles group struck back—during 1930 and 1931 eighteen attempts were made on the life of Meyer Shapiro; he was killed on the *nineteenth*. Brother Irving followed, and Willie was abducted, severely beaten, and buried alive. The Reles group took over gambling, loansharking, and prostitution in the East New York–Brownsville and Ocean Hill sections of Brooklyn; their major specialty, however, became murder.

The "boys from Brooklyn" were used as staff killers by the confederation of organized-crime leaders that evolved in New York. In addition to their various criminal enterprises, the "boys" received a retainer to be "on call" whenever the occasion arose—and it arose often; in a ten-year period they murdered more than eighty persons in the borough of Brooklyn alone. They were so efficient that gang leaders from across the country made use of their services.

There were full-dress rehearsals; getaway routes were carefully checked; a "crash car" followed the stolen vehicle containing the actual killer (in the event of a police pursuit); guns were rendered untraceable, although ice picks and ropes were also used. One of the group's members described the "contract system" (Berger 1940: 5): The killer ("trooper") is merely directed to take a plane, car, or train to a certain place to meet "a man." The man points out ("fingers") the victim for the trooper, who kills him when it is convenient. He then leaves town immediately, and when local hoodlums are questioned, their alibis are perfect. For the "boys from Brooklyn," murder was an art form. Pittsburgh Phil, for example, delighted in roping a victim like a little ball so that any movement pulled the line tighter and he eventually strangled himself (Turkus and Feder 1951).

Jenna Weissman Joselit (1983: 153) stresses the level of intergroup cooperation: ". . . the Jewish and Italian members of the gang worked side by side on a daily basis, physically molesting tardy borrowers and stubborn union leaders. Moreover, the gang took its orders from Albert Anastasia" even though Reles was considered the leader of the "boys from Brooklyn." Louis Capone was Anastasia's personnel representative and served as a buffer between the Reles and Maione parts of Murder, Inc.

In 1940 several of the "boys from Brooklyn" were indicted for the 1933 murder of Alec ("Red") Alpert. The nineteen-year-old had been "convicted" of talking to the authorities. Quite to the surprise of Burton Turkus, chief of the Homicide Bureau of the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, one of the group's members who agreed to become a government witness was reputedly the toughest of the "boys." Abe Reles, upon being granted immunity from prosecution, began to disclose the sensational details of Murder, Inc., and seven men were eventually convicted and electrocuted, including Lepke Buchalter and Louis Capone. Before any case could be made against Albert Anastasia, Reles had an accident: on November 12, 1941, while under constant police guard, he fell out the sixth-floor window of a Coney Island hotel. His death remains unexplained.

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[1]*Poolrooms* were places where lottery ("pool") tickets were sold. The drawings were held in the evenings, and the owners installed billiard tables to help customers pass the time while waiting for the lottery results (Katcher 1959).

[2]John ("Jack") Pullman was born in Russia in 1903. He was an associate of Lansky's during Prohibition and in 1931 served a fifteen-month sentence for bootlegging. He lived in Chicago, emigrated to Canada, and finally settled in Switzerland in 1960 (Petacque and Hough 1983).

[3]United States Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Chairman.

[4]Scalise (known as "Don Cheech") made his peace with Luciano and eventually emerged as the *sottocapo* of the Family headed by Albert Anastasia. On June 17, 1957, at age sixty-three, Scalise was shot to death in the Bronx. Joseph Valachi (Maas 1968) says that he was selling memberships—people were paying him up to $50,000 to be "made." This activity apparently infuriated Anastasia, who ordered Scalise's murder.

[5]Corallo received his nickname because of an ability to escape ("duck") assassinations and convictions. During the 1960s, this "ability" apparently faded. In 1961 he tried to bribe J. Vincent Keogh, a New York State supreme court judge, and Elliott Kahaner, chief assistant United States attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and received a two-year prison term. The case he was looking to "fix" involved James Marcus, commissioner of the New York City Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity, and Carmine De Sapio, head of Tammany Hall.

[6]Salvatore ("Bill") Bonanno and Joseph C. Bonanno, Jr., the sons of Joseph Bonanno, have served prison terms for conspiracy and extortion.